Make Up a System (2.0)

True! If I had an Ademco security system, I would of been a feinatic too.

Mr Guy’s High School. (Don’t ask the about the Name)

Date Built:

1950s

Original System:

NA’s: Simplex 4030s
Initiating Devices: Simplex Couch Coded Pull Station.
NAC: A Coded Panel.

1958: Mr Guy’s High School was built.

1970: Mr Guy noticed some of the Alarms were failing, so he replaced the 4030s with 4050-80s, the Panel with a 4208, and the Pulls with 4251-30s. Some Remote Lights were added in the Bathrooms because Mr Guy didn’t want to get startled by Horns in his Bathrooms. Some of the 4030s still stand. But Inactive.

1981: Mr Guy wanted his System to have Battery Backup so he Replaced the 4050-80s with 2903-9001 + 2901-9806s. He also added Simplex 2098-9544 Detectors. The Remote Lights were replaced with 2904-9001s. The Panel was upgraded to a 2001. Some of the 4050-80s still stand, but inactive. The 4030s and some Coded Pull Stations are intact, but Inactive.

1986: Mr Guy wanted Voice Evacuation Alarms because the School has gone through some Renovations so he Removed the 2903s and Replaced them with 4903-9101s + 2902-9732s. The 2001 was upgraded to a Voice Evacuation Control Cabinet. The 2904s were kept. Some of the 2903s are still in use.

1987: Some Idiot Stole a Coded Pull Station. Mr Guy Expelled the Idiot. The Coded Pull Station was put on display in Mr Guys Office and the Hole were it once was had a Cover placed over it.

1990: A Tornado Came and Damaged the School. 50% of the Remaining 2903s got damaged and were removed. At least one was saved.

1995: ADA became a thing. Simplex Horizontal 4903 Speaker Strobes were installed next to the 4903-9101s.

2010: Wheelock ET70 Speakers replaced all but 2 original 4903 Speaker Strobes. TrueAlert Speaker Strobes were added so they can sync with the ET70-24MCW Speaker Strobes.

2025: A few 4050-80s fell into the Hands of an Enthusiast.

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Mr Guy High School? That’s a odd name. My name, Arnold Ray Middle School was a odd name for me!

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I think those pull stations came out around 1963, they most likely would’ve used rebranded Autocall/IBM model NY units or possibly Couch oval coded pulls, which I don’t think Simplex rebranded any of the latter.

Fire Alarms at a large gymnastics studio;

This is a very gender inclusive place. People here perform lots of cool tricks.

A majority of the alarms are Simplex 4903-9174 Speaker/Strobes (70V Speakers, 110CD Strobes). These have date codes of HUW & JUW. They have the ‘110CD’ stickers on the strobe reflectors. These are located in very large open areas hence the reason they have all the 110CD Strobes.

Simplex 4903-9358 QuickAlert Speaker/Strobe 110CD from 2000 made on the 43rd week of 2000.

Simplex 4903-9168 Speaker/Strobes in the stairwells as well as 1 Small Hallway; these are 15CD just cuz they are in a very small tight space. These ones have a date code of JTW & KTW. These have a green asterisk on the strobe reflector.

There’s also a few Simplex 4903-9171 Speaker/Strobes these ones are 30CD and has a date code of DUW. A 30CD Sticker takes place on the strobe reflector. These are in rooms where they need a little less bright strobe and there’s hallways that have these 30CD units

The bathrooms have Simplex 4904-9135 30CD strobes from 2000

There’s a 4904-9136 110CD strobe as well from 2000

There’s only 1 Simplex 4904-9137 which is 15CD. This one has a date code of KTW and is from 1999 according to a stamp. This one has a Green Asterisk on the strobe reflector.

They also have 4904-9169 75CD Free Run Strobes

These strobes are not synced because they are free run and the 4903-9174 Speaker/Strobes have very bright strobes.

These units were installed between 1999 and 2000 of course as mentioned. They’ve removed a few 4903-9174 Speaker/Strobes from a different section and they are in good condition. The tone played here is a Code 3 Tone. Most Speakers are even set on 2 Watts! They’re pretty loud for Speaker/Strobes. The voice message is enabled.

(continuing again from my last post in the thread!)

Tenant Office Space

While the UL commercial burglary standards clearly lay out how mercantile-type spaces are to be protected from the perils of burglary, the issue of office security is less clear, especially with the more intimate space-sharing that is common in multitenant office environments.

As a result of this space-sharing, I decided on a “hybrid” system for the tenant office spaces, where the physical access control system for the space works in conjunction with the alarm system to manage the overall security posture of the office spaces in an intuitive manner.

This also assumes that the offices are configured to group the offices into sub-areas by tenant. Were this to be a true “suite” system, each office would need its door managed individually instead of being simply keyed to a tenant key.

Visitors in the office spaces are handled through an IP intercom system that is integrated with the office telephone system. As a result, internal telephone switching for the office tenants is part of the service package supplied to them for their maintenance charge, as opposed to being something supplied by the tenants individually.

Access to the PSTN, though, is still something the tenants have to pay for themselves, and they are also required to provide equipment for their own LAN and Internet access as well.

As a result of all this, the system consists of:

  • An IP telephone system for the various offices implemented using:

    • A Grandstream GXV3350 phone in each office, all powered using PoE and with their secondary network connections disabled
    • A 48-port (for the large section) or 24-port (for the small section) + upstream PoE switch that connects the PBX to the phones
    • An 8 port + upstream Ethernet switch that connects the PBX to the intercoms (2 ports), IP cameras (up to 4 ports), the conference room IP phone (a Grandstream GAC2500), and the management station – this switch also connects to the tenant network SIP trunks in the smaller section
    • A 5 port Ethernet switch in the large section that connects the PBX to incoming tenant network SIP trunks
    • A Grandstream UCM6304A (for the large section) or UCM6302A (for the small section) IP PBX/ATA combination with the analog FXO ports being available to connect to analog trunks derived from the tenants’ Internet access equipment, 1 per tenant
    • A LifeSafetyPower RD250-16P (large section) or RD150-16P (small section) rackmounted power supply/distribution unit, set for 12V and with its battery detect jumper removed, that provides:
      • A 2A power output for the PBX
      • Power outputs (12V at 0.75A each in the large section, or a single 12V at 1A output in the small section) for the WAN-side switches that connect the PBX to the intercoms and to SIP trunks
      • A parallel combination of 2 power outputs to supply 3A for the main intercom unit
      • A 2A power output for the secondary intercom (if present)
      • Up to 2A of 12V per office tenant to power customer network service equipment (ONTs)
      • And 3.5A (large section) or 2A (small section) of spare 12V for IP cameras connected to the entry system
    • And an APC Smart-UPS SURTD6000RMXLP3U with 6 (large section) or 4 (small section) SURT192RMXLBP3U battery modules and an AP9614 dry contact monitoring card set to configuration 3 fitted
      • This UPS is powered from the standby power system and provides power to the PoE switch and rackmount 12V supplies
      • The battery modules add enough battery capacity to supply 8+ hours of “CO” battery talk time for both internal and external calls
      • Alarm monitoring for the UPSes is implemented by connecting the on-battery, low-battery, and common alarm relays on the UPS monitoring card, as well as the common fault relay from the rackmount supply, to a point input on one of the section’s input cards
  • A 2N IP Style intercom at the interior entrance to each of the two office sections to serve as the primary intercom

    • This is powered from via a diode-OR of telecom system power and access control power for the section
    • It uses the 2N secure relay to provide its door trigger output to the access control logic for the associated door
    • Its OSDP output serves as the credential input for that door to the access control system
    • And it also provides a duress output directly to the intrusion system for that section using its on-board relay
    • This door also has an interior credential reader at it that is connected to the access control system via OSDP as well – this can be an ICT PRX-TSEC-MINI-DF-B, Axis A4020-E, CDVI KRYPTO K1, Bosch/STid ARC1-W33-B/PH5B-201/A (or its Honeywell equivalent), or any other MIFARE EVx/OSDP v2 mullion mount reader
  • A 2N IP Force intercom at the exterior entrance to the large office section

    • This is powered from the telecom power system for its office section
    • It also uses a 2N secure relay module for its door trigger output
    • It, however, is paired with an external credential reader that talks OSDP directly to the access control system
    • This door, like the lobby doors, also has an interior credential reader used for additional functionality
  • The exterior credential reader at the exterior entrance and the two exterior exit doors are 13.56MHz MIFARE EVx compatible, OSDP v2 (secure communications) capable, IK10 vandal-resistance-rated keypad/reader combinations. These requirements are met by the:

    • ICT PRX-TSEC-EXTRA-KP-BT-B-VRC,
    • XPR Readers XP-K-MF-WO fitted with an XP-ATP rainshield,
    • Autec XMP-TM3000-VN,
    • and the OSDP version of the Third Millenium RX3K90.
  • The interior credential reader at the large section’s exterior entry door and the external credential readers at all the shared doors are connected to the access control systems via Cypress ODM-2010 OSDP splitters (a tree of 3 of them per reader for the large section, a single splitter per reader for the small section)

  • The access control systems are powered from a single central rackmount supply, plugged into the talk battery UPS and consisting of:

    • A LifeSafetyPower RD150-16P (large section) or RD75-16P (small section),
    • set for 24V to provide a set of 24V outputs for lock power,
    • with its battery detect jumper fitted,
    • 2 22Ah (large section) or 2 12Ah (small section) 12V batteries mounted inside the power supply
    • its common fault relay monitored by the same zone that monitors the UPS,
    • and fitted with a Siemens SITOP 6EP3124-0TA00-0AY0 (large section) or Traco TCL 060-112 DC (small section) converter instead of the normal converter module to provide isolated 12VDC to one of the distribution cards in the power supply – this is reader and controller power
  • An access control system for each office suite, consisting of:

    • An ICT Protege WX PRT-WX-DIN-IP access controller, connected to the tenant LAN
    • 2 co-located ICT Protege WX PRT-HRDM-DIN 2-door expander modules for each suite in the large section or a single PRT-HRDM-DIN module for each suite in the small section
    • a MIFARE EVx/OSDP v2 reader at the entrance door to each office suite
    • the Protege WX’s relays wired as NO door control for the respective doors:
      • Door 1 is the interior door for the corresponding office suite, and its outputs control the cross-trip zone for that suite
      • Door 2 is the lobby door for that section, and its buzzer output is connected to the keyswitch zone for that suite
      • Door 3 is the exit door for the section
      • Door 4 is used for an interior reader for arming and disarming the system
      • Door 5 is the exterior entrance to the larger section
      • and Door 6 is the interior reader output for the exterior entrance to the larger section
    • Input 1 for each door on the Protege WX is wired to a set of repeater contacts for that door
    • and Input 2 for the interior suite doors is wired to a TEOL REX switch in the lockset via a set of Securitech Yamakas mounted on the latch side
      • This is set up so the two shunt resistors (one on the latch side and one on the door side) are twice the value of the series resistor
      • The programming sets R1 and R2 to half of the value of R3, which is in turn programmed to match the series resistor value
      • The door states are set up using the Protege’s zone doubling TEOL support as follows:
        • S1 (0 ohms) = short
        • S2 (R1 ohms) = normal (both closed)
        • S3 (R1+R2 ohms) = low (REX) open, high (door) closed
        • S4 (R1+R3 ohms) = tamper (impossible state)
        • S5 (R1+R2+R3 ohms) = both points open
        • and S6 (infinite ohms) = tamper (open)
  • The doors themselves have ACSI Gemini 8500-M1-PUL-L9080 storeroom function, fail-secure, locked-outside-only, frame-actuator-controlled mortise locks fitted to them to perform the actual door unlocking duties

  • The intrusion alarm itself is configured as follows, using B208 octo-input cards in addition to the built-in inputs on the panel:

    • Panel Zone 1 is connected to the duress inputs from the lobby intercoms as well as those from that building’s residential intercom stations
    • Panel Zone 2 is a 24h zone connected to the glassbreak sensors for the interior entrance in the small section
    • Panel Zone 3 is a controlled/delayed perimeter zone connected to a set of door contacts on the interior entrance (lobby) door to the small section
    • Panel Zone 4 is connected to the arming control contacts from the access controls for the small section
    • Panel Zone 6 is a 24h zone connected to the glassbreak sensors for the interior entrance in the large section
    • Panel Zone 7 is a controlled/delayed perimeter zone connected to a set of door contacts on the interior entrance (lobby) door to the large section
    • Panel Zone 8 is an immediate perimeter zone that connects to a loop of window protection detectors in the small section
    • Zone 1 on Card 1 (large section) or Zone 1 (small section) is connected to supervise the telecom/access control power system, including the UPS and the DC power supplies – a short on the zone indicates AC failure, while a fault on the zone can indicate a UPS fault or an issue with a DC supply
    • Zone 2 on Card 1 (large section) or Zone 2 (small section) is a controlled interior zone connected to a door contact on the conference room door for that section
    • Zone 3 on Card 1 (large section) or Zone 3 (small section) is a controlled/immediate perimeter zone connected to a door contact circuit for the back door for that section
      • This door has a shunt circuit on it
    • Zone 4 on Card 1 (large section) or Zone 4 (small section) is a 24h zone connected to the glassbreak zone protecting the glazing in and around the back door for that section
    • Zone 5 on Card 1 in the large section is a controlled/immediate perimeter zone connected to a door contact circuit for the exterior entrance door
    • Zone 6 on Card 1 in the large section is a 24h glassbreak zone protecting the glazing at and around the exterior entrance door
    • Zone 7 on Card 1 is connected to the arming control inputs from the access controls for the large section
    • Zone 8 on Card 1 in the large section is connected to the window protection loop for the large section
    • Zone 1 on Card 2 (large section) or Zone 5 (small section) is a cross-trip zone for both trouble (door 1 buzzer) and alarm (door 1 LED) outputs from the first suite’s access controller – this is a controlled/immediate zone, and is wired so that troubles create an fault condition (via a NO relay contact held closed by an inverted trouble output from the Protege) and alarms create a short condition on the zone
    • Zone 2 on Card 2 (large section) or Zone 6 (small section) is a maintained keyswitch zone wired using a NO relay so the Protege has to activate the corresponding output (door 2 buzzer) to disarm the zone
    • Zone 3 on Card 2 (large section) or Zone 7 (small section) are the cross-trip zones from the second suite’s access controller
    • Zone 4 on Card 2 (large section) or Zone 8 (small section) are the keyswitch zones from the second suite’s access controller
    • Zones 5 and 7 on Card 2 are the cross-trip zones from the third and forth suites’ access controllers in the large section
    • Zones 6 and 8 on Card 2 are the keyswitch zones from the third and fourth suites’ access controllers in the large section
  • There is also a B308 octo-output card, mounted at the alarm panel, that provides the STAY/AWAY and ARM/DISARM outputs for each of the two sections

  • Each individual suite door is controlled directly by its corresponding access controller

    • Triple tapping one’s credential will arm the system for the suite
  • The back exit doors are controlled by the paralleled combination of the access controller output relays for that door qualified by the arm-STAY relay contact

    • with a shunt circuit that is energized by:
      • the strike signal via a diode
      • or an arm-STAY-qualified REX shunt contact
  • The lobby doors are controlled by a circuit that consists of:

    • The lobby door contacts from the door controllers ORed with
    • the intercom door relay circuit, qualified by either the disarmed state or the arm-STAY state
    • This door also has a shunt on it, using the arm-STAY relay to qualify an OR of:
      • a REX shunt contact
      • and a diode connection from strike power
  • The exterior entrance door to the larger section is controlled by a more complex logic circuit that consists of

    • All four individual door relay outputs from the access controllers connected in parallel with
    • the ARM/DISARM relay selecting between:
      • the raw intercom door relay output when in DISARM
      • and a time circuit in ARM that consists of the internal-reader “door” relays from the access controllers ORed with each other and qualified by
      • the NO contact from an AlarmSaf UT-10 that is:
        • powered from 24V lock power
        • triggered by the intercom relay output
        • and set for positive trigger one-shot mode with a 90 second time delay
      • run into the paralleled contacts of the internal-reader relays
    • This is all globally qualified by the arm-STAY relay contact
    • This door’s shunt circuit is energized by:
      • strike power via a diode
      • OR an arm-STAY-qualified REX shunt contact
  • Each of these perimeter doors has a DPS repeater and a REX shunt circuit on it:

    • The DPS repeater consists of 1 or 2 RIBMN2401Ds fed from the 24V strike supply via a spare contact on the DPS
    • While the REX shunt circuit uses a 2W-MOD2 to monitor the REX signal via another set of Securitech Yamaka contacts along with a PAM-4’s NC contacts wired to generate a pulse as follows:
      • the 2W-MOD2 is powered from 24V locking power, and the zone common on pin 11 is also wired to 24V
      • the 2W-MOD2’s zone alarm output on pin 10 is connected to the coil positive on the PAM-4
      • the 2W-MOD2’s zone trouble output on pin 12 is connected in series with the PAM-4’s NC contact to provide a “wet” REX output to downstream
      • and the PAM-4’s coil negative is grounded
    • This REX pulse is then “stretched” using a Securitron TM-2 in one-shot mode, with its NO contact used to shunt the door circuit and its open NC contact used to inhibit the door repeater relays
      • The reset input on the TM-2 is held asserted by the strike timer from the intercom qualified by an arm-STAY repeater contact
  • Each of the office windows, which are of the same limited-travel hopper style as the operable windows in the ground floor residential units, has a set of sensors connected into the NC window alarm loop for its section that consists of:

    • A piezo glassbreak detector (Aritech 5150, Ademco ASC-SS1, or the like) on the window glazing, connected in series with
    • A GRI4561-R tilt sensor,
    • with both devices connected to the loop via a Tane PPD-11 disconnect plug and socket

The overall result is the equivalent of an Extent 3 perimeter intrusion system that is in arm-STAY when commanded by any of the the access controls or when at least one of the suites is armed, and goes to arm-AWAY when all the suites are armed. The back exit doors are configured with a prealarm function for door prop alarming while disarmed, and one can enter via:

  • the lobby doors by badge + PIN in any mode or just a badge when disarmed
  • the lobby doors by intercom or temporary PIN when disarmed or armed STAY
  • the exit door by badge when disarmed or badge + PIN when armed STAY
  • the exterior entrance door by badge when disarmed or badge + PIN when armed STAY
  • the exterior entrance door by intercom when disarmed
  • or the exterior entrance door by intercom when armed STAY provided that the person letting you in presents their credential to the interior reader to unlock the door (if they don’t, the REX timer will be inhibited and it’ll thus register as an alarm)

Note, though, that the use of piezo glassbreaks (instead of acoustic types, which’d be less appropriate in an office application where stay-arming the system is a thing) means that it’s not fully UL 681 conformant.

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Simplex/Wheelock Fire Alarms at an Old Acting Theatre:

Simplex 4903-9236 Horn/Strobes (These have a Candela rating of 15, Green Asterisk shown on reflector)

Simplex 4903-9237 Horn/Strobes (These have a Candela rating of 30, Blue Circle shown on reflector)

Simplex 4903-9238 Horn/Strobes (These have a Candela rating of 110, Orange Triangle shown on reflector)

Simplex 4903-9219 Horn/Strobes (These have a Candela rating of 15, Green Asterisk shown on reflector)

Simplex 4903-9215 Horn/Strobes (These have a Candela rating of 30, Blue Circle shown on reflector)

Simplex 4903-9217 Horn/Strobes (These have a Candela rating of 110, Orange Triangle shown on reflector)

Simplex 4903-9240 Horn/Strobes (These have a Candela rating of 110, Orange Triangle shown on reflector)

Simplex 4903-9218 Horn/Strobes (These have a Candela rating of 110, Orange Triangle shown on reflector)

Simplex 4903-9426, 9427 (4 Wire TrueAlerts, 75 and 110CD Ratings Respectively)

Simplex 4903-9254 Horn/Strobes (Selectable 4903s, 110CD)

Simplex 4903-9419 QuickAlert, TrueAlert Horn/Strobes (These are 110CD SmartSync)

Simplex 4904-9331 QuickAlert Strobes (15CD)

Simplex 4904-9332 QuickAlert Strobes (75CD)

Simplex 4904-9333 QuickAlert Strobes (110CD)

Simplex 4903-9418 QuickAlert Horn/Strobes (These are 75CD SmartSync)

Simplex 4903-9417 QuickAlert Horn/Strobes (These are 15CD SmartSync)

Simplex 4901-9820 QuickAlert Horns

Simplex 4906-9127 Horn/Strobes

Simplex 4904-9137 Strobes (15CD, Green Asterisk on Strobe reflector)

Simplex 4904-9135 Strobes (30CD, Blue Circle on Strobe reflector)

Simplex 4904-9136 Strobes (110CD, Orange Triangle on Strobe reflector)

Wheelock Exceeder & AS Horn/Strobes all Multi Candela

These are in very red, grey and orange hallways. The Horn/Strobes despite being next to each other in the same sized hallway are different candelas. This theatre is fancy. It looks like a late 1990’s building inside however it is older than that. All the Fire Alarms here are in very good condition and sound very healthy. The horns are coded to temporal code 3. The 4903 electromechanical horns are from 1997, the 4903 electronic horns are from 1999, the QuickAlerts are from 1999-2000 and the TrueAlerts are from 2003-Present. The Exceeder and AS Horn/Strobes are from 2007-2019. Most of the alarms here are 4903 Electronic Horn/Strobes in Section A and QuickAlerts in Section B. Section B has better lighting than section A. No this is not a movie theater, this is an acting theatre with very fancy food areas that look like college dining halls. This place even has a bowling alley with Simplex 4903 110CD Horn/Strobes and 4904 15CD Strobes. This place gets their fire alarms tested on the first Tuesday of January since 2009. Since 2008 they switched to a new company to test the system which is why they skipped that year. They used to do their tests on the 1st Friday of August.

Tests Conducted on:

Tuesday, January 6, 2009
Tuesday, January 5, 2010
Tuesday, January 4, 2011
Tuesday, January 3, 2012
Tuesday, January 1, 2013
Tuesday, January 7, 2014
Tuesday, January 6, 2015
Tuesday, January 5, 2016
Tuesday, January 3, 2017
Tuesday, January 2, 2018
Tuesday, January 1, 2019
Tuesday, January 7, 2020
Tuesday, January 5, 2021
Tuesday, January 4, 2022
Tuesday, January 3, 2023
Tuesday, January 2, 2024
Tuesday, January 7, 2025

The next test will be done on Tuesday, January 6, 2026 and they will switch the date once they conduct the 2027 test skipping 2028. The test dates will then get switched to the last Monday of May in 2029 and will get changed after another 20 years is up.

Every alarm here is in very good condition! No paint, scratches, nothing! They are spotless

For a Canadian take:

The First Credit Trust Building

This building consists of 4 stories of apartments atop a 2-story podium with a grocer and a financial institution branch on the first floor, and the FI’s offices on the second floor. It is adjoined to an extensively remodeled early 1900s 5-story joisted-masonry building that has two maisonette live-work units occupying the first three floors along with paired flats on floors 4 and 5. The two buildings match up as follows due to different floor-to-ceiling heights on the podium floors:

  • The 1st floor elevation is the same
  • The 2nd floors don’t match up, although they don’t have to at all
  • The 3rd floor in the live-work units doesn’t match up with anything else
  • The 4th floor in the smaller building matches up with the 3rd (yes) floor in the larger building
  • The 5th floor in the smaller building matches up with the 4th floor in the larger building
  • And the 5th and 6th floors in the larger building have no corresponding floors in the smaller building

There is also a rooftop patio for the apartment residents on the remaining podium roof space. Internal to the building, there are 2 full height stairshafts, a full height elevator shaft, a partial height stairshaft, and an elevator shaft that extends above the podium roof into the patio space:

  • The first full-height stairshaft is located at the back of the larger building where it joins to the rear of the smaller building, and connects to all occupied floors as well as having a hatch connection to the roof. It also has a gated and locked off connection to a vacant basement void space underneath the grocery store.
  • The second full-height stairshaft and the full-height elevator shaft are located at the back of the residential lobby, about 1/3rd of the way back on the first floor on the left side of what would otherwise be the bank bay when facing the front facade. These shafts are blind to the second floor, but connect to all other floors and the basement storage area.
  • And the partial height stair and elevator shafts are located at the back right of the bank bay, in front of the stacked vaults that serve the bank and offices. They connect to a money-handling work area in the basement, back-of-house spaces on the main floor, and the offices on the second floor. These stairs also have a connection in the basement from the storage area and are controlled against ingress into the bank areas on all floors, with a direct exit to the alley on the right side of the building.

The rear of the smaller building has an open egress balcony that serves the 4th and 5th floors by connecting them to the back stair tower in the larger building and an exterior staircase connecting an egress landing at the back of the 3rd floor down to the ground level. It also has an internal staircase that provides the main entrance to the flats on the 4th and 5th floors, with a vestibule on the ground floor that houses the mailboxes and intercom for that section of the building, as well as an entrance vestibule to each flat.

The maisonnete units have a live/work space occupying the front of the main floor, with a kitchen/breakroom and communicating accessible bathroom behind it, and a bedroom/office area in back en-suited to the communicating bathroom. An internal staircase connects the kitchen/breakroom area to the sunroom/secondary living area on the mezzanine level, as well as to the bedroom and bathroom spaces on the 2nd and 3rd floors.

Fire Alarm System

The building has a conventional fire alarm system consisting of a Mircom FA-1000 series panel driving an Eaton Intellgent Notification Controller. This system covers all residential and commercial spaces, using:

  • Wheelock Eluxa ELHS sounder strobes in the corridors,
  • ELHSC sounder strobes in the grocery bay, office, and storage spaces,
  • EL4XHS NEMA 4X weatherproof sounder strobes in the grocery store’s walk-ins,
  • ELAMTST addressable multitone strobes set for “siren, horn, chime” and using the horn for fire notification supplemented by ELSTC strobes in the bank bay and its workspaces,
  • and ELFHN low frequency sounders in the apartment bedrooms supplemented by the built-in sounders on the apartment smoke detectors

Detection is performed using System Sensor conventional detectors, consisting of:

  • 4WTR-B’s in the elevator lobbies,
  • 4WTR-B’s in the elevator shafts, mounted on swingout hatches to permit access to the detector,
  • 2WT-B’s on MOD2Ws in the apartment corridors, with one zone per floor,
  • 2WT-B’s on MOD2Ws in the stairshafts as follows, with one zone per stairshaft:
    • The main exit stairshaft has detectors on the third and sixth floors as well as one in the basement,
    • The back-of-house stairshaft has a detector on the second floor,
    • and the main stair in the older building has detectors on the top (fifth) floor and on the landing that is where the second floor should be (but isn’t connected)
  • 4WT-B’s in the back exit stairshaft at the third and sixth floors as well as a 4WTR-B at the fourth floor protecting the fire door there,
  • 4WT-B’s in the electrical closets, connected to the corridor smoke zones,
  • 4WTR-B’s in the grocery bay, reporting to both the fire alarm panel and the grocery store intrusion panel,
  • and 2WT-B’s on MOD2Ws for the:
    • office area (2nd floor, 11 per module, with all 3 modules on the same zone)
    • bank back of house (1st floor) and vault workroom,
    • and bank front of house areas

There are also VESDA VLF-500-UL aspirating detectors for the first and second floor vault spaces:

  • The detector in the first floor vault space is used for suppression releasing, is fitted with a VIC-020 card to add extra I/O, and is powered via a diode-OR of nonresettable auxiliary power from the releasing panel, nonresettable auxiliary power from the main fire alarm system, and supervisory 24VDC power from the UPS/IT supervision system, and
  • the detector for the second floor vault space is located just outside the vault space and provides high-sensitivity local area protection for the records vault. Note that this detector uses copper tubing for its sampling line instead of plastic due to the stringent combustibles control requirements imposed by the NFPA standards for record vaults. It also uses a spare relay contact to control the smoke damper on the ventilation opening, and has a PAM-SD relay’s NC contacts connected to its GPI to provide resetting from smoke detector resettable power connected to the relay’s coil,

and an Xtralis OSI-R reflective beam detector protecting the nearly 9m tall lobby/atrium space that serves as the primary residential entrance for the building. This detector is in addition to the wall-mounted 4WTR-B that serves as the first floor elevator recall detector for the main elevator bank.

The first floor vault also has a System Sensor 5623 fixed temperature heat detector in it to provide an overheat supervisory condition to the fire alarm panel and to the IT controls for the space to trigger emergency actions (emergency ventilation/cooling, EPO) before the sprinklers kick in. The IT controls are also fed a secondary preaction output from the VESDA that inhibits emergency ventilation and triggers an EPO if smoke is present in the space in addition to heat. This is in addition to the VESDA’s general alarm relay being monitored directly by the main fire alarm panel due to the limited capacity of the releasing panel to distinguish between a releasing alarm and a general alarm.

Manual initiation is performed using Mircom MS-701U pull stations, except for inside the first floor vault (IT space) and the crossover door unlock station in the basement. The IT space uses a Notifier NBG-12LRAA to provide a combination releasing station and suppression abort switch.

The crossover door unlock setup, though, is more complicated as it has to release the door directly in addition to alerting the security system of its use. This is done using a STI G3C1A2RM-EN pushbutton station with an alarmed cover and integral IP camera with:

  • the cover alarm relay set to activate an auxiliary alarm in the security system,
  • its power supply connected to the security system power supply,
  • a NO contact on the button used to activate the fire alarm sytem,
  • and a NC contact on the button used to directly cut the fire relay loop from the delayed egress hardware on the door.

The system has a custom graphical annunciator driven by a MGD-32/AGD-048 pair and located in the residential lobby space, and all system AC power is supplied from the building standby bus.

Apartment Fire Alarms

(TBD, WIP, …)

Suppression

The building is protected throughout by a wet-head sprinkler system, zoned as follows:

  • Grocery bay
  • Bank bay + basement workspace and vault
  • Office level
  • Residential lobby and storage area
  • Each of the two live-work units,
  • and a zone per floor on floors 3 through 6

This system is supervised by the main fire panel, and fed from municipal water through a backflow preventer without the aid of a fire pump. The walk-in units in the grocery store are protected by individual dry-pendent heads dropped from the sprinkler main.

There is also a Victaulic Vortex 500 system in the first floor “vault” that protects the computer equipment located there. It is initiated and supervised by a Honeywell MRP-2002C releasing panel. Notification for the space consists of:

  • Wheelock AMT-24MCW-FW addressable multitone strobes, set for “Code 3 horn, bell, siren”,
  • fitted into Wheelock RSSPA-24MCW-ALW strobe expander plates, and augmented by a
  • Wheelock MTR-24MCW-FW set as a bell and mounted outside the space
  • that is also fitted into a Wheelock RSSPA-24MCW-ALW strobe expander.

The panel’s zones and NACs are wired as follows:

  • Zone 1 is pre-alarm and trouble from the VESDA
  • Zone 2 is action (suppression threshold) from the VESDA
  • Zone 3 is reserved for further outputs from the VESDA
  • Zone 4 is a combination manual release & abort zone
  • Zone 5 is a combined discharge & supervisory (programmed as waterflow & supervisory) zone from the Vortex controller and the external discharge disconnect
  • Zone 6 is reserved
  • NAC 1 is connected to the Vortex controller via a Notifier MRD-1 discharge disconnect switch (that also trips the supervisory zone) and a REL-4.7K releasing supervision module
    • It also drives the red discharge strobe on the outside of the vault
  • NAC 2 is set to a continuous ON state by a pre-alarm/alert condition from the VESDA
    • It drives a SSU-PAM-SD relay that triggers a supervisory zone on the main fire alarm panel
    • It also is connected to the amber expansion strobes, both inside and outside the space
    • And it drives a circuit that codes a slow (10 bpm) march time input to the electronic bell signals inside and outside the space
      • This circuit sits at the end of this NAC, is powered from the panel’s resettable detector supply, and consists of:
        • a trio of RIBMN2401D DPDT relays that “graft” the bells from NAC 4 onto NAC 2 during coding while making sure both NACs are properly terminated at all times
        • SSU-PAM-SD polar relays, one on NAC 4 and one on NAC 2, connected in line with the auxiliary 24V power so that the NAC 4 relay must be de-energized and the NAC 2 relay must be energized in order to trigger the timer
        • and an Elko CRM-2H-UNI asymmetric cycle timer set to deliver 0.5 second on followed by 5.5 seconds off when it is energized, whose NO contact energizes the coils on the DPDT relays.
  • NAC 3 is set to a continuous ON state by the control panel going into predischarge and turns OFF during discharge
    • It sets off the temporal horn inputs on the multitones inside the space
  • NAC 4 is set continuous-ON when the panel goes into alarm (predischarge and discharge)
    • It sets off the bell inputs on the multitones inside the space,
    • causes the multitones outside the space to sound as a continous bell,
    • and it also fires the strobes inside the space
  • And the supervisory and trouble relays are wired to cross-trip the main panel should there be a supervisory or trouble condition on the releasing panel. The alarm relay, though, trips a supervisory zone, as we don’t want a suppression discharge to trigger building evacuation.

Dwelling Unit Security

The units in the main building and the flats on floors 4 and 5 of the smaller building each have access to an intercom system consisting of:

  • Fermax 10" MEET WIT indoor monitors in the units, with their 2nd Ethernet ports available to connect to tenant networks
  • One PoE switch per floor
  • a Fermax MEET MARINE door panel at the main entrance door,
    • powered from an Altronix AL300ULXJG fitted with 2 20Ah batteries in parallel and wired to the standby power bus
    • and using a Fermax 1490 remote relay module to unlock the main door
  • and 3 ONVIF IP cameras that provide surveillance of the back exit, all powered from 12VDC:
    • A 2MP minidome that watches over the back exit’s connection to the rooftop patio as well as over traffic traversing the back exit up and down,
    • A 2MP minidome that covers the upper floors of the back exit,
    • and a 2MP minidome that covers the back exit passage on the first floor

The flats on floors 4 and 5 of the smaller building also have access to a 2x2 FERMAX MARINE SIP video intercom panel that is powered from PoE. This intercom unlocks its associated door through an Algo 8063 SIP door controller that is also PoE powered. Access control for the door is provided using a Securitron DK-16 keypad in the vestibule with its CPU board mounted in the wiring closet; this arrangement runs on the battery-backed 12VDC supply.

Live-Work Units

The live-work units each have burglar alarm systems that protect both the residential and commercial portions of the space. These systems provide Security Level I premises protection that can be set up as Extent 2 or 1D depending on the arming mode and system configuration, along with the facilities to support Extent Partial protection of a single office safe as per ULC-S302, using the following hardware:

  • A Bosch B6512 panel, shared between the two bays and fitted with:
    • an ICP-EZTS tamper switch
    • and a B444-A2 cellular communicator of its own
  • 3 B208 SDI2 input cards per bay (in order to establish correct cross-zone grouping) in addition to the zones on the panel
  • And a B920 keypad in each bay, located near the front of the kitchen

that is set up with the following hardwired sensors:

  • Contacts on the front (storefront) door of each unit:
    • set up in cross-zoning group 1
    • and set as a perimeter entry delay zone
  • Contacts on both back doors (which are hollow metal or solid slab with a closer-holder as they are 45 minute rated fire doors) set up as perimeter zones
    • The door on the first floor is on entry delay with an entrance function deadbolt lock (LV9453 or equivalent) on it
    • While the door on third floor is on an immediate zone with a storeroom function deadbolt lock (LV9480 or equivalent) on it
  • Glassbreak sensors protecting the glazing in each unit as follows:
    • A Honeywell FG1025Z directional acoustic glassbreak on a perimeter zone in cross-zoning group 1 to protect the glazing in the front (storefront) door and its divided sidelight
    • Another FG1025Z acoustic glassbreak on a 24h zone in cross-zoning group 2, set up to protect the storefront glazing
    • And a piezo glassbreak “bug” (Aritech 5150 or equivalent) on a 24h zone in cross-zoning group 2 and applied to the inside pane of the storefront glazing as well to verify storefront glazing breakage signals
  • Anti-mask dual tech motion sensors on a delayed perimeter zone in cross-zoning group 1 protecting the shop spaces on the first floor (these sensors aren’t pet immune, but the cross-zoning deals with that problem, unless the inhabitants have cats that play with china on the regular)
  • A set of contacts on the front bathroom door connected to an immediate perimeter zone
  • Contacts on each bedroom door, connected to interior zones
  • Pet-immune dual tech motion sensors on interior zones in the following areas:
    • The office/bedroom and kitchen on the first floor
    • The sunroom/living space on the mezzanine level
    • And the bedrooms on the second and third floors, with one zone per floor
  • GRI VS-08 Vent Switches connected to an immediate perimeter zone protecting the movable panes on the Eurostyle single-hung movable windows in the sunroom
  • Contacts on the rear ground floor windows, connected to a 24h zone set up to permit the tilt-only windows on this floor to be tilted without triggering the alarm
  • Contacts on a perimeter loop for the second and third floor windows, also set up to permit the windows to be tilted without alarming, although they will alarm if the window is turned
  • Honeywell FG1025Zs on a perimeter zone in the second and third floor bedrooms providing glassbreak protection to the 2nd and 3rd floor windows
  • Honeywell FG1025Zs on a 24h zone in cross-zoning group 3 in the first floor bedroom/office space, working with
  • piezo glassbreak “bugs” (Aritech 5150 or equivalent) on those first floor office windows that are also on a 24h zone in cross-zoning group 3 to protect the windows in that space from glass breakage
  • And 3 24h zones reserved for the office safe so that shunted contacts, duress/panic code protection, and seismic protection can be provided for it.

They also have a lockout system for the first floor communicating bathroom to prevent unwanted intrusions, consisting of the following parts:

  • Schlage L9460/XL11-886 mortise deadbolts with deadbolt monitoring strikes on both doors
  • Ives RL30 roller latches on both doors to keep the doors closed when not in use
  • RCI YD30S motorized bolt locks, set to Fail Safe mode, in both frames locking into strikes on the doors
  • A Camden CM1180-7024 or equivalent DPDT momentary keyswitch with a 24V red LED indicator outside the bathroom at the private-side door to serve as an occupancy indicator and emergency release
  • A closer on the private-side bathroom door to make sure it isn’t left open while the bathroom is in use (this can be a closer-holder controlled from the NC side of the lock control output for that door)
  • A SDC UR2-4 controller in an Altronix AL175ULX supply set for 24V with 2 4Ah batteries fitted, set up as follows:
    • The UR2-4 is set for a 20 second unlock time with Door 1 locked and Door 2 unlocked by default (Interlock ‘C’ mode) and the monitor relays set to follow the lock relays
    • Outputs 1 and 3 are set up as dry NO contacts with their common terminal connections and the return for the boltlocks connected to the AL175ULX auxiliary power output via the keyswitch release
    • Output 4 is a wet NO contact, connected in parallel with the closed-while-secure contacts of the deadbolt monitoring strike on the private-side door, that drives the low side of the annunciator LEDs
    • Output 2 is a dry NC contact that is wired in series with the actuation signal to the operator (to prevent it from operating if the door is locked)
    • The public door is connected to Door 1 of the UR2-4
    • The private door is connected to Door 2 of the UR2-4
    • Door 1’s REN input is connected to the access control output
    • And the UR2-4 is powered from the auxiliary output of the AL175ULX
  • A LCN 6440XP closer-operator kit top jamb mounted on the public-side door (which swings out of the bathroom, by the way) and powered from its own supply,
  • with a SDC 484A2U single gang double pole pushplate to serve as its actuator – the other pole is in parallel with the REN sensor output to provide an access control request signal to the locking controller
  • A relay, driven by the burglar alarm system, that inhibits all REN signals and disables the operator motor while the alarm is armed
  • A contact from the public-side deadbolt monitor that inhibits the operator motor while the deadbolt on that side is thrown (to prevent the operator from trying to open the door against the deadbolt)
  • And an access control setup for the public-side door that consists of:
    • A R2E-100 active infrared REX sensor,
      • powered from the access control supply,
      • focused on the entrance-side handle,
      • and with its NO contact connected in parallel with the unlocking contact from the pushpad
    • And a Transmitter Solutions DOLKSF1KB standalone keypad, jumpered for auto backlighting, set to standalone mode, and wired as follows:
      • Its power terminals are connected to the lock power supply
      • Relay 2 is used to provide a pulsed (15 second) NO 24V unlock signal
      • Relay 1 is a toggle used to select between the 24V unlock signal from Relay 1 (NC) and the unlock signal from the REX sensor & pushpad (NO)
      • Relay 3 is used to turn on the coil of a RIBMN2401D DPDT relay that shunts both the Relay 1 signal and the door opener operation signal
      • The tamper switch is wired to a tamper circuit from the alarm system
      • And the red wire from the Wiegand harness is connected to the occupancy annunciator output

The lockout system ensures that nobody can use the bathroom as a passage between the public and private sides of the space, while the deadbolts are there to provide privacy for bathroom users. The keyswitch serves as an emergency door release in case of trouble, while one of the keypad LEDs and the keyswitch LED provide occupancy annunciation for the bathroom.

Access to the public side while the alarm is disarmed is governed by the tenant’s choice of keycode or free access via REN sensor, and a low energy operator is provided to meet NBCC requirements for single-occupant accessible restrooms.

Commercial Intrusion & Access Control

Grocery Bay

The grocery store has a basic intrusion alarm system for after-hours and limited holdup protection that also provides building supervision functions and a tenant-managed local CCTV system that is separate from the intrusion alarms. There is also a full-power sliding door at the main entrance and a power-operated overhead door for the rear loading dock, both of which have access control functionality.

The power-operated front door is a motor-operated sliding door in an X/SO configuration with:

  • BEA Ultimo sensors on both the inside and outside to cover safety and operational needs,
  • The relay on the 4101SN at the door putting the door in automatic mode when the system is disarmed and closed mode when the system is armed
  • Magnetic switches for breakout sensing
  • And a Paxton10 Switch2 setup used to provide the night-stay opening contact for the main door that is powered using an Altronix VR1 to step the 24-28V door operator auxiliary supply down to 12V and consists of:
    • A Switch2 controller in an enclosure within the store that also houses the VR1
    • A connection from the Switch2’s case tamper to the security system tamper loop
    • A pair of K50 Touchlock keypads, one on each side of the main door
    • And an Altronix RB1224 DPDT relay used to simultaneously shunt the intrusion point for the door and switch the night operation input on the door operator

The overhead (roll-up) dock door also has a power operator, leveler, and vehicle restraint/interlock system that consists of the following components:

  • A Nice Pro-LT operator for the dock door with
  • a Miller Edge RLC-K36 relay light curtain whose NC contacts are inline with the close input from the Dok-Commander as backup protection
  • The combination of:
    • a Rite-Hite Global Wheel-Lok GWL2300 autochock/dock-lock,
    • a Rite-Hite RHV4100 vertical storing dock leveler, equipped with a pit safety sensor,
    • and a Rite-Hite Dok-Commander controller that interlocks the leveler, dock-lock, and door operations, set up to interlock the leveler with dock door closure
  • A 24h zone from the intrusion system that monitors the Dok-Commander’s security output
  • An exterior red/green “traffic light” connected to the Dok-Commander
  • Additional monitoring switches for the dock door to determine if it is in its fully open or fully closed position
  • And an intercom/CCTV system for the dock area personnel door consisting of the following parts:
    • A 2MP outdoor rated IP PoE (ONVIF) dome camera that has a view of both the driver’s side of a backed-in truck and the dock-lock/auto-chock
    • A Viking X-35-SS-EWP SIP video intercom mounted outside, next to the pedestrian door
    • A Viking K-1900-6-IP panel handset mounted in the dock area to answer calls
    • A Viking SR-1 loudringer in the office to notify people that someone’s waiting at the dock
    • A ViewZ VZ-24IPM IP security display mounted on the inside of the dock to show what the cameras see
    • A 5-port industrial-grade PoE Ethernet switch to connect the pieces together
    • And an Essex SKE-34S keypad, mounted adjacent to the panel handset, with:
      • An Altronix RB1224 relay connected to the 2nd output to both unlock the door and shunt the alarm zone when a valid code is entered
      • A Functional Devices RIBMNU1C relay driven by the 3rd output to trigger an immediate perimeter alarm if someone is playing guessing games with the keypad
      • A Traco TIW24-124 powering the lock, keypad, and door prop alarm
      • A standalone SDC EA-SN door prop alarm (as the prop alarm function on the Essex keypad can’t be set to not also be a “door forced” alarm, which would lead to a false alarm if a legitimate keyholder opens the door by key while the system’s armed) set up with:
        • Power connected to 24V lock/keypad power
        • its door contact input connected to additional contacts on the door
        • its bypass/reset terminals connected to the NC contact from the keypad’s main relay output
        • and its alarm relay connected into the same perimeter zone as the 3rd relay of the keypad
      • An ACSI Gemini 8500-M1-PUL-L9080 storeroom function frame actuator controlled mortise lockset to unlock the door in lieu of using an electric strike or normal electrified mortise hardware
      • And a tamper switch on a tamper loop to protect the keypad itself, as well as the wiring associated with it and the door prop alarm

This CCTV system by default provides a view and looped recording of goings-on at the dock itself; when a call is made from the intercom, the intercom (this may or may not require an IR blaster or a USB-HID macro gadget controlled by the intercom’s relay) causes the display to pop up a picture-in-picture view of the intercom’s video stream while recording the intercom as well. The keypad then can be used to unlock and open the door while shunting the alarm.

The intrusion system itself consists of the following components, arranged to provide Security Level II, Extent 2 premises protection along with Extent Partial protection for the office safe as per ULC-S302:

  • A Honeywell Vista-128BPT panel,
  • in a VISTA-ULKT cabinet,
  • wired to 2 17Ah batteries in parallel,
  • with a 6160 keypad located behind the service counter
  • and connected to the panel via an ECP-ISO located at the panel,
  • a 4208SN V-Plex zone expander fitted to provide additional supervisory zone capacity,
  • a 4101SN connected to the V-Plex bus to provide both the supervisory input and arm/disarm output for the main entrance door,
  • and a pair of 4208EX double-balanced V-Plex zone expanders installed for the burglary zones,
  • connected via the panel’s keybus port to a LTE-KCN communicator
  • and wired so that its bell output is supervised and provides:
    • triggers to the V1 and S3 inputs of an ELK-120 voice siren driver, set for Siren and Repeat modes with recording disabled but set to the internal mic,
    • that drives an ELK-73 compact echo-type speaker mounted to the ceiling grid

that are set up with:

  • A pair of contacts on the main sliding (automatic) doors to the space, connected to a perimeter delay zone
  • Contacts on the door to the back stairshaft, connected to an immediate perimeter zone
  • Contacts on the personnel exit door from the loading dock area, connected to an immediate perimeter zone and shunted by the loading dock intercom system
  • Acoustic glassbreak sensors protecting the glazing and sidelights in the main door area, connected to an immediate perimeter zone
  • Two further immediate perimeter zones of acoustic glassbreak sensors, one on each street-facing side, to protect the clerestory or storefront glazing on those frontages
  • Ceiling mounted dual technology 360° motion detectors on interior zones to provide internal motion detection for the store floor (this is done using 7 motion detectors to provide an overlapping pattern)
    • The detector nearest to the front door is on an interior follower zone to provide an alley to the keypad
  • A dual technology motion detector on an interior zone in the back office
  • Contacts on the door to the back office, also on an interior zone
  • More dual tech motion detectors on an interior zone protecting the entrances to and exits from the main stockroom space, as well as the entrances to the walk-ins
  • Dual tech ceiling mount motion detectors on the same interior zone as the stockroom entry/exit detectors covering the dry goods section of the stockroom
  • A 24h zone that monitors the dock interlock system
  • A dual technology motion detector on an interior zone covering the loading dock personnel door and the loading dock door
  • A 24h zone for cash register holdup switches/bill traps
  • And a safe protection system consisting of:
    • A set of timelock-shunted contacts on the safe door, put on a 24h zone
    • A 24h zone that accepts holdup/duress inputs from the safe lock and/or a discrete holdup switch located at the safe
    • And a seismic detector on an interior zone

The main CCTV system for the store consists of four 2MP PoE dome cameras:

  • one at the main entrance that’s aimed to record people entering and exiting
  • one located at the checkout lines,
  • one at the main door to the back of house spaces, and
  • one at the exit from the grocery back of house space into the exit stairshaft,
  • all connected to a Vivotek ND9213P PoE NVR that drives a HDMI display near the front entrance to the store.
  • There is also an 2MP IP camera in the grocery office area:
    • powered from the intrusion alarm 12V supply
    • aimed to protect the money-handling parts of the office
    • and fitted with a local SD card for recording,
    • as well as an alarm output to the intrusion panel, driven from on-camera analytics

(continuing from previous post)

Grocery Bay Supervision and Auxilary Alarms

The grocery bay’s intrusion alarm panel is also connected to:

  • A zone wired to the relay outputs from the smoke detectors protecting the store to provide remote notification of an incipient fire,
  • A zone wired to the spare contacts on the waterflow switch for the store,
  • Zones wired to notify the system of generator running and fault conditions,
  • A zone wired to panic switches inside the walkins,
  • A zone wired to high-temperature alert switches for the back-of-house walkins,
  • A zone wired to indicate a fault condition in the central refrigeration plant,
  • A zone wired to the alarm contacts on the door operator for the front door
  • And a zone wired to the refrigerant leak detectors for the central refrigeration plant.

The refrigerant detection system, in turn, consists of the following parts:

  • Senva TGW-ADX-A sensors located in the machine room and in the walkins
  • A System Sensor MP120KL to power each sensor and its accompanying strobes from local AC power
  • A SWK-P strobe, connected through the local sensor’s alarm relay, to provide a local evacuation alarm in each walk-in
  • A SWL-P strobe, also connected through the local sensor’s alarm relay, to provide a local evacuation alarm in the machine room
  • SWL-P strobes with LENS-R2 lenses at the entrances to each of the spaces in question to provide exterior warning of a hazardous condition, all connected through the alarm relays of the corresponding sensors
  • And a NO supervisory loop from the alarm panel that is tripped by the fan relays from all the sensors to provide an early warning to HQ of a gross refrigerant leak that needs to be investigated

Bank and Offices

The bank and office spaces, on the other hand, have a quite elaborate intrusion and access control system that is also partially integrated with the public address/paging system for the bank, as well as using some of the auxiliary notification capabilities available from the addressable multitone appliances in the bank bay.

The first layer is a video doorbell system of sorts, using the chime tones on the audible appliances and video monitoring via the CCTV camera in the vestibule, that lets the tellers unlock the inner vestibule door for customers. It doesn’t supply two-way audio communications, but

Once inside, the doors leading into the back of house spaces are access controlled by the intrusion and access control system; this system is intended to provide:

  • Security Level III, Extent 3 premises protection for the bank branch and vault areas as per ULC-S302 in addition to supplemental protection for the IT and record vaults,
  • in addition to Extent Complete protection of all safes, ATMs, and night depositories on the premises,
  • and Extent Complete protection of the main cash vault, located in the basement.

It also is responsible for monitoring the main fire alarm system for alarm, trouble, supervisory, and waterflow conditions; the alarm condition is taken from a panel NAC via a PAM-SD relay, while the other conditions are communicated using the panel’s relays. The system consists of:

  • A DMP XR550EA-G panel mounted in the vault, equipped with:
    • a DMP 7873H-W high security keypad, mounted in one of the back-desk spaces front-of-house, with a Farpointe Delta-5.3-Sector-OSDP reader attached to it (this serves as the enrollment reader for access control)
    • a DMP 715-8 zone expander that monitors the fire alarm panel’s relays and the NO zones from the safe and vault heat/smoke detectors
    • a DMP 736V V-Plex loop module controlling Honeywell 4208EX zone expanders to avoid burning up zones unnecessarily on tamper contacts as DMP’s own zone expanders can’t do DEOL/3-state zones,
    • a DMP 263LTE cellular communicator with its antenna mounted on the outside of the IT space above the vault,
    • and an IP path via the panel’s Ethernet port for backup communications, with the following parts running off a diode-OR of the XR550’s supply with the supply from the elevator communication system:
      • An Ubiquiti EdgeRouter-X that provides firewall protection and routing/switching to all building systems that have an IP connection
      • And the ONT used to terminate the FI’s business fiber connection

monitoring the following sensors:

  • A FG1625RFM glassbreak on an immediate zone assigned to the main area to cover the entry vestibule glazing (both inner and outer portions)
  • A FG1025Z directional glassbreak on the same immediate perimeter zone, mounted just inside the bank lobby, to provide additional protection to the inner vestibule glazing
  • Anti-mask dual tech motion sensors on an delay zone assigned to the main area covering the front-of-house space
  • Anti-mask dual tech motion sensors on an immediate zone for the main area covering the back-of-house spaces along with contacts on the office doors in that space, also on immediate zones
  • Anti-mask dual tech motion sensors on an immediate main zone in the restrooms on the bank floor
  • A zone for dual-action holdup alarm switches (Potter HUB-T, Resideo 268, or equivalent) and bill traps at the teller lines and drive-through window
  • A zone for similar dual-action holdup switches in the vault and vault workroom areas, as well as the holdup/ambush output from the vault lock
  • Anti-mask dual tech motion sensors on main area immediate zones protecting the vault workroom and vestibule areas
  • Anti-mask dual tech motion sensors on main area immediate zones at the front and back office exits
  • Anti-mask dual tech motion sensors on separate areas for the IT closet/room and the record vault
  • The following zones for the ATM:
    • A single EOL area zone on the ATM area for heat detection, using a FDD 7050 heat detector
    • A 24h zone for seismic detection, connected to a Bosch ISN-SM-80 seismic detector
    • An immediate area zone on the ATM area for the ATM safe contacts
    • A maintained keyswitch zone connected to the ATM safe lock’s shunt contacts
    • A 24h zone for the ATM safe lock (a Kaba Mas Cencon)'s ambush (panic) contacts
    • And a delayed/door prop zone on a separate area for the ATM top hat, which has a separately keyed high security lock fitted
    • There is also a W-Box 0E-SRNSTROBT siren-strobe that is used as an immediate local sounder for the ATM top hat:
      • fitted with a polarizing diode,
      • set up with its tamper switch connected into the top hat zone as a tamper,
      • and connected to a DMP 865 card located at the keypad
      • that is driven by the relay in the keypad
      • and monitored for trouble by a keypad zone
  • Zones for the night depository:
    • A single EOL zone on a night depository area for heat detection, using another FDD 7050
    • A 24h zone for seismic detection, connected to another Bosch ISN-SM-80
    • A 24h zone for the night depository’s head contacts to prevent the head from being removed
    • A connection to the ATM’s 24h holdup zone for the night depository lock’s ambush contacts
    • An immediate area zone on the night depository area for the night depository’s safe contacts
    • And a maintained keyswitch zone connected to the shunt contacts from the night depository’s safe lock
  • And the following set of zones protecting the main vault:
    • A single EOL zone in the vault area for vault smoke and heat detection, connected directly to a System Sensor 2151TA in a B110LP base mounted above the vault door (it’s a horrible punt because there just aren’t products designed for this job)
    • A 24h zone for vault seismic detection, connected to a set of Bosch ISN-SM-80s protecting all surfaces of the vault
    • An immediate area zone in the vault’s area for the vault door
    • A maintained keyswitch zone connected to the vault lock’s shunt output
    • And an immediate area zone in the vault area for an anti-mask dual tech motion sensor covering the vault interior

and providing access control to the following doors:

  • The inner vestibule door at the main entrance (which has a double-cylinder deadbolt on it in addition to the latchset)
  • The main door from the front of house space into the back of house spaces
  • The vault vestibule access door in the basement
  • The back stair exit door on the 2nd floor
  • The door to the first floor IT room
  • The door to the second floor record vault
  • The door to the back-of-house space adjacent to the vestibule
  • and all three doors from the bank spaces into the sidestair, with the stair side of the doors as the ingress side

using the following hardware:

  • A DMP 734 access control card for each door
  • High-security door contacts on each door to provide door position indication, with the main door contact on zone 2 and the tamper contact on zone 1 (as DMP expansion zones don’t support 3-state/DEOL wiring)
  • a SDC WPT wireless power transfer to bring the REX(AE) switch from the door hardware across to the frame side, where it is connected as a NC SEOL zone on zone 3 of the access control card
  • zone 4 on the access control card is connected a NO SEOL zone that monitors the tamper output from the WPT
  • Farpointe Delta5.3-Sector-OSDP readers on the entry side of the doors
  • Accurate M9159E-AE electrified locksets powered via the WPTs
  • And Altronix AL300ULXJ supplies in secure areas (the first floor IT room, the ATM back-of-house closet, and the vault vestibule area) to supply 24VDC power to the power transfer and lock
    • These supplies run off of standby power, and are fitted with an ACM4CB access control relay module as well as 2 18Ah batteries in series
    • The FAI on these supplies, though, is deliberately unused to prevent a FA trip somewhere else in the building from violating bank security – this is fine because the door hardware itself permits free egress autonomously

There is also a Securitron BA-DPA-12 on the exit door from the sidestair (which has a Von Duprin LDXP98EO panic on it) to serve as a manual reset door prop/forced door alarm, wired as follows:

  • Power to it is supplied from the alarm system
  • Lock status is wired to a latchbolt monitor on the rim strike
  • Door status is wired to a set of contacts on the door
  • the reset input is wired to the contacts on a Honeywell 4101SN connected to the V-Plex bus from the 736V
  • and the alarm relay is wired to a 24h zone on the alarm panel

Notification for the intrusion system is supplied by a combination of:

  • the siren tones on the multitone horns in the bank bay spaces,
  • two Resideo/Honeywell AB12M high security bells with
    • one located on the back of the building adjacent to the vaults
    • and the other on the front of the bank behind an ornamental metal grille,
  • and the PA system in the bank bay spaces, consisting of the following:
    • 3 of the 4 output audio channels from an Atlas IED IPS-ZC4 SIP-to-analog paging gateway
      • one of the channels serves the front of house spaces
      • a second channel serves the back of house spaces
      • the third channel serves the vault and workroom
      • and the fourth channel directly feeds the paging amplifier for the office spaces
    • a RDL FP-MR2 record/playback module in line with the front-of-house channel and powered from that channel
      • holding a message announcing that the bank is closing,
      • and wired with its playback input connected to an AlarmSaf UT-10 timer:
        • configured for non-retriggerable one-shot mode:
        • powered from the 24V supply to the channel,
        • set for a 1 second pulse,
        • and triggered from an armed-state output from the intrusion system
    • a Bogen TG4C paging tone generator module in-line with each channel, producing a siren tone output that is triggered by the alarm bell output from the alarm panel
    • a RDL ST-VP2 ducker in each channel that is connected with:
      • its music input wired to the output from the tone generator
      • and its message input wired to the auxiliary audio output from the surveillance system NVR via a series 10k resistor followed by the NC shunt contacts of a PAM-4 that is:
        • shared among the channels
        • and driven by the bell output from the alarm system
    • and connected to one or more SigCom DAPB-100 power boosters via a:
      • RDL ST-PA2 2W amplifier
      • driving the 2W tap on a Bogen T725 transformer used to step up the audio to 25V,
      • which also feeds a RDL TX-PCR1 paging controlled relay that provides the DAPB-100(s) with the contact closure trigger input they are looking for
    • The PA speakers are a flush-mounted, tamper-resistant and tamper-switch-fitted, 25V/70V type capable of high dB SPL@1W output and at least 12W of power handling, permitting 2 speakers to be used on each channel of the DAPB-100
  • And the DAPB-100 trouble outputs are connected to the notification tamper zone on the intrusion alarm system along with the tamper switches on the PA speakers
  • There is also a Viking MSB-30-EWP in the bank lobby, wired up as follows:
    • Its speaker input is connected to the pre-mute NVR audio
    • Its microphone output is connected to the NVR’s audio input
    • Its power input is connected to 12V DC from the security system supply
    • its button output is connected to a discrete input on the NVR
    • and its LED input is connected to a discrete output from the NVR
  • Another discrete input on the NVR is used to monitor an alarm output from the intrusion system that is driven for both audible and silent alarms

The bank also has an A/V surveillance system that consists of:

  • the aforementioned NVR, which is a Digital Watchdog DW-VG4162T16P located in the IT room and powered from the room’s UPS,
  • 2 5-6MP corner cameras providing surveillance of the vault interior and antechamber areas,
  • a 12MP fisheye ceiling camera overseeing the main front-of-house space,
  • a 5-6MP box camera pointed at the main entrance to augment the fisheye camera and provide a visible deterrent,
  • the 5MP covert camera located within the crossover door release in the basement,
  • a 5-6MP wide-angle camera above the ATM in the entrance vestibule and equipped with an auxiliary HDMI output,
  • a 5-6MP corner camera located near the entrance to the document vault on the 2nd floor,
  • 5-6 MP dome cameras located at both of the 2nd floor exits,
  • a 5-6MP corner camera located in the 2nd floor elevator lobby,
  • an outdoor rated 5-6MP wide-angle camera covering the drive-through window,
  • and a 5-6 MP dome camera located in the back of house space near the main entrance from the front-of-house

All of the bank cameras, save for the covert camera in the door release station, have built-in microphones as well. This system is configured to permit the central station to remotely access it to perform interactive audiovisual verification of alarm conditions, using the public address system within supported spaces as well as the camera and microphone coverage.

Additionally, the tellers have access to a CCTV “doorbell” system that consists of:

  • A weatherproof single gang doorbell switch that activates the chimes on the multitone appliances via a relay channel in the access control supply
  • A StarTech HDMI-SPLITTER-44K60S 4-way 4K HDMI splitter with an active HDMI cable connecting it to the auxiliary output from the corner camera in the entry vestibule
  • 7" HD LCD monitors at each teller station connected to the outputs of the splitter
  • And a SDC 15-2 pushbutton at each teller station that unlocks the inner vestibule door, qualified by a closed-on-disarm output from the intrusion system

This system lets the tellers let in customers during business hours, while requiring access controlled entry/exit when the system is armed.

Finally, the crossover door connecting the partial-height stairshaft to the basement storage area is equipped with a SDC ExitCheck 1100SNAK delayed egress maglock. This maglock is:

  • configured with the E energy saver, A anti-tamper, and VEF bilingual options,
  • paired with bilingual versions of the California “KEEP PUSHING/PULLING” delayed egress signs on the door,
  • set for 15 seconds with a 2 second nuisance delay, manual reset, internal trigger, locking on powerup, and the male voice message,
  • mounted on the push (storage) side of the door,
  • and wired as follows:
    • the speaker outputs are connected to a SDC 101-SP remote speaker on the pull (stair) side of the door,
    • the power input is supplied by the security system 12V supply,
    • the fire alarm input is connected to the series combination of the NC contacts on the dedicated releasing manual station (button) and the NC contacts on a PAM-SD relay wired into one of the NACs,
    • and the alarm relay and tamper contacts are connected to an alarm zone on the intrusion panel.

Elevator Auxiliaries

There are two elevator communication systems in the building: one for the elevator in the bank bay and the other for the building’s main elevators.

The bank bay elevator has an IP-based system that is connected to a downstream port on the EdgeRouter-X and consists of:

  • A 2N Sentrio communicator in the elevator, powered from 12V fed down the traveling cable on a separate pair
  • A Viking LV-1K verification annunciator connected to a relay from the Sentrio
  • NXP RDDRONE-T1ADAPT media converters in the elevator car and controlspace, with the converters powered by Altronix VR1TM5 regulator modules
  • An unmanaged 4-port industrial Ethernet switch in the elevator car, run from the 12VDC supply
  • A 2MP IP dome camera in the elevator
  • and a power supply that consists of an AL300ULB that is:
    • mounted in a BC800 enclosure located near the elevator controller,
    • powered by standby power,
    • fitted out with 3 (!) 20Ah batteries to provide >24h of full draw runtime,
    • and set for 12V operation.

The main elevators use a standalone IP-based system that consists of:

  • a K-Tech Connect Core in each elevator with a corner USB camera mated to it
  • K-Tech hardware of…some sort? for the machine room phone and elevator communications alarm (as it’s not at all clear how that works in the K-Tech system)
  • An Altronix Pace1KL12S media converter and a Konnected 12V-5V converter in each car to provide power and data to the Connect Core over a single pair
  • An Altronix Pace3KL 10Base-T1L converting switch connected to both cars and the router
  • A Peplink MAX Adapter LTE router powered from another Konnected 12V-5V converter providing data connectivity for the elevators
  • And an AL300ULX to power it all that is:
    • set for 12V operation
    • fitted with an 20Ah battery
    • and powered from the building’s standby power system
1 Like

Some random building that would find in a small downtown.

The building was built in 1931. The building never had a dire alarm system until 1983. The first floor serves retail/restrictions while the 2nd and 3rd floor is apartments

System:

Panel:
Simplex 2001 (1983-2023)
Resideo Vista 128FBPT (2023-Present)

1st Floor Lobby, 2nd and 3rd Floor:

Signals:
Original
Simplex 2901-9833s+2903-9001s
Deficiency replacements:
Simplex 4903-9220
Gentex Commander 3

Pull Stations:
Simplex 4251-20s

Detectors:
Simplex 2098-9636

Retail Space #1:

Random video store from 1994 that became a art store

Signals:
Gentex SHG24-15/75WR
Gentex GXS24-15/75WR

Pull Stations:
AIP AIP-270-SPO

Detectors:
System Sensor 2400s

Retail Space #2:

Typical Meillinal Burger Place from the 2010s:

Signals:
System Sensor P2W
System Sensor SW

Pull Station:
FireLite BG-12L

Detectors:
System Sensor 2151

Retail Space #3:

Arcade that opened in the late 80s

Signals:

Simplex 2901-9838 on 4903-9101

Pull Station:
Simplex 4251-20

Detectors:
Simplex 2901-9806

Retail Space #3:

Computer Repair shop that used to be a mobile store

Signals:
Wheelock AS-24MCW-FR
Wheelock RSS-24MCW-FR

Pull Station:
Silent Knight PS-SATK

Smoke Detectors:
System sensor 2151

Retail Space #4:

Some coffie shop:

Signals:
System Sensor P241575
System Sensor S241575

Pull Station:
FireLite BG-8

Detectors:
System Sensor 2100

Retail Space #5:

Candy store that opned in 2019

Signals:
System Sensor P2WL
System Sensor SWL

Pull Stations:
FireLite BG-12L

Detectors:
System Sensor 2151

Retail Space #6:

A Subway from the 90s:

Signals:
Wheelock MT-24-LSM
Wheelock LS1M-24

Pull Station:
Original:
FireLite BG-10
Replacement:
Resideo 5140MPS-1

Outdoor:

Signals:
Original:
Simplex 2901-9833
Replacement:
System Sensor P1224MCK

This time around, we’re back in the US with a much smaller system, mostly centered on bank burglary with a side of sprinkler monitoring. The building in question is a sprinklered 3 story single stair corner building of joisted masonry construction with a bank on the ground floor and apartments on the floors above, located on a small town’s Main Street.

Bank Intrusion

The bank is protected by a UL Extent 2 bank burglary system consisting of:

  • A Honeywell Vista-20P, mounted in a VISTA-ULKT enclosure inside the vault and wired to:
    • A 6160 keypad located behind the teller line via an ECP-ISO isolator mounted in the panel enclosure
    • A pair of 18 Ah batteries with a SA5140-1 harness to provide upwards of 72h of standby
    • A Honyewell LTE-HSV communicator via the ECP bus
    • And a Honeywell AB12M motor bell, with bell supervision on the panel enabled.

The bell is mounted outside above the ATM and the communicator is located in the IT closet behind the conference room in order to provide adequate cellular signal without relying on external antennae. The communicator also has a 72 hour auxiliary supply, consisting of:

  • an Altronix AL125ULB set for 12V and powering the communicator from its auxiliary output
  • in a VISTA-ULKT attack enclosure
  • with 2 more 18Ah batteries wired in parallel to it.

The panel’s zones are wired as follows, with Zone 1 in EOL mode and the remaining zones set for double-balanced operation:

  • Zone 1 is the panel tamper loop, set for Trouble by Day/Alarm by Night and providing tamper protection for the panel, bell, and communicator as well as the communicator fault output
  • Zone 2 is the vault zone, set for 24h protection and connected to:
    • Honeywell SC100 vault seismic detectors on all six sides of the vault and the vault door, with the tamper contact connections looped back through the cable
    • A FDD 7050-C vault heat detector located over the vault door
    • And a high-security contact on the vault door, with a shunt lead coming in from the vault lock’s shunt contacts
  • Zone 3 is the ATM/night depository zone, also set for 24h protection and connected to:
    • Honeywell SC105 seismic detectors on the door and body of each safe/chest,
    • Lock shunted contacts for each safe/chest door,
    • And the head protection contacts on the night depository. (The ATM head uses a high security lock, but is only otherwise protected by a contact connected to a discrete input on the ATM computer.)
  • Zone 4 is set for interior protection and connected to high security contacts on all interior doors, including the doors to the sprinkler and IT/telecom closets, and yes, the bathroom door too
  • Zone 5 is the entry/exit zone for the high security contacts on the front door
  • Zone 6 is an immediate perimeter zone, connected to FG1625RFM glassbreak sensors in the lobby, offices, and conference room to protect the windows there as well as the door glazing
  • Zone 7 is the motion zone, set as an interior follower and connected to anti-mask dual tech motion sensors (Bosch ISC-PDL1-WA18Gs) in the conference room, offices, vault, and lobby, with their mask contacts wired as series tampers in the doubled-back tamper loop
  • And Zone 8 is a 24h silent zone connected to Potter HUB-T double-action holdup switches inside the vault and at the teller stations, as well as the ambush outputs from the vault, ATM, and night depository locks.

There are Honeywell SC115 remote test transmitters located at opposite corners of the vault to provide a test facility for the seismic detectors. These transmitters are wired to a DPDT momentary keyed test switch inside the vault that also shunts out zone 3 via an EOL resistor for the duration of the test.

The bank also has two POE IP cameras with SD cards for local recording in it; one of them is a 360° fisheye ceiling camera that sees the entire lobby, while the other is a dome camera tucked into the back of the vault with a good view of the vault door.

Sprinkler Monitoring

Zones 6 and 7 on the communicator are configured for EOL operation and connected to the building’s waterflow and sprinkler supervisory switches, respectively, providing them with 24-hour central station supervision, thankfully at no extra charge.

Residential Fire

The apartments are fitted with standard 120V/9V interconnected smoke alarms, nothing more. The doors do have commercial-grade (LCN 4040) closers on them, although without holders for security reasons.

Residential Access Control

The inner door to the residential area stair vestibule is governed by a DormaKaba PowerPlex 2000 self-powered (energy harvesting) electronic lockset paired with a Von Duprin LDXP98 rim exit device and an Abloy KIK cylinder for key override. This provides access for residents and servicepeople, while a basic wired doorbell shared among the units and a peephole in the door is sufficient for visitor access in a building this small.

Individual apartment locking is handled using Schlage L9453s on the apartment doors, with a good grade of mortise cylinder fitted to them.

Going back to the fire side, we have a small addressable system for a ~500-occupant food hall, doing sprinkler monitoring and hood supervision with provisions for future elevator recall. There is also a fuel gas and CO monitoring and alarm system for the kitchen spaces that is intended to provide early warning and shutoff of fuel gas for the building.

Fire Alarm

This system uses a Potter AFC-50 as the panel with Altronix AL1002ULADA NAC extenders as needed. The panel is mounted in the building’s entry vestibule to remove the need for a separate annunciator. Communication is handled using a Honeywell HW-AV-LTE-M(-2) communicator wired to the AFC-50 either through dial capture (preferably) or through relay triggers, and powered from the panel’s battery. The panel’s SLC loop is wired as isolated Class B branches beyond the self-protection detector, with one branch for the hoods and sprinkler monitoring and one branch per elevator recall provision.

Initiation

  • The waterflow and supervisory switches are standard-issue Potter fare, connected to a PAD100-DIM dual input module
  • There is one PAD100-PSSA addressable pull station in the building, located in the sprinkler closet
  • There is a PAD300-PHD in the vestibule to self-protect the panel, and provisions for PAD300-PHDs at each of the two main floor elevator landings (one at the front stairs, opposite the entry vestibule, and the other at the back dock area), with further extension of the SLC upwards from there
  • Each machine room or equivalent has a SLC connection for the future installation of a PAD100-TRTI to provide the obligatory elevator recall outputs (main recall, alternate recall) and a PAD300-PHD on a PAD300-RB base (mounted to a swingout door if it needs to be in the shaft) to provide machine room smoke detection and the flashing hat output for the elevator,
  • Each of the tenant hoods and the main kitchen hood system have PAD100-MIMs at them to trigger the main fire alarm system using one of the mechanical trigger microswitches.
  • And there is a American Gas Safety Mini Merlin CH4CO-TWA located on the corridor wall in front of the main kitchen (i.e. behind the six hood-equipped tenant bays) that has its relays monitored by a PAD100-DIM and powers a 120V solenoid gas valve in the sprinkler closet to provide a global gas shutoff should an appliance spill CO or leak gas out into the kitchen areas. This is done globally mostly for cost reasons, but also to provide additional protection should a gas leak be in supply piping outside a tenant bay.

Hood Suppression and Shutdown

Each kitchen with a hood in it has a mechanical gas valve to provide gas shutoff if the kitchen hood suppression in that space fires. The hood systems themselves consist of:

  • prepackaged UL300 systems in the six hood-equipped tenant bays
  • and a CaptiveAire CORE system for the main kitchen hood (this system was chosen because it can provide a much larger quantity of follow-on suppression than a typical UL300 system can).

Each hood also has paralleled thermostats (Thermotech 302 or equivalent 135°F sealed, self-resetting, probe type units) in it that provide an alternate power path from the exhaust fan circuit’s hot to a RIB2401B’s 120V coil terminal. This relay’s NO contacts shunt out the the exhaust fan side of the double-pole switch that controls the exhaust and makeup fans to provide “night mode” backup operation of the exhaust fan.

Finally, each hood suppression system is connected to a contactor shutdown circuit consisting of the following parts:

  • A 3 phase MLO subpanel that is set up to use an appropriately rated (could be the rating of the panel, or could be smaller if the full panel rating won’t ever be used) 3-pole contactor with a 120V coil as its main device (instead of a circuit breaker)
    • Everything electrical under the hood runs off this panel
  • A microswitch from the hood system, whose:
    • NC lead is connected to terminal 4 of an Ansul 426151 reset relay as well as providing a hot to the fan control switch for the makeup air fan
    • NO lead is connected to the exhaust fan in parallel with the other sources
    • and common lead is connected to terminal 3 of the reset relay
  • And the aforementioned reset relay, wired with:
    • terminal 2 to the exhaust fan’s hot,
    • terminal 5 to the exhaust fan circuit’s neutral along with one of the contactor coil terminals,
    • and terminal 1 to the contactor’s other coil terminal

This provides manual-reset shutdown for all electrical and gas appliances under the hood, as well as “night mode” thermostatic operation of the exhaust fan, and a single switch to control both the exhaust and makeup air fans.

Notification

All notification appliances in the building are Gentex GEC3-24WR hornstrobes, with separate NACs for horn and strobe operation to permit the panel to code the NACs to the alarm condition in question. Fire and CO alarms, of course, code Temporal 3 and 4 respectively, while March Time in this system is used for fuel gas alarms. The appliances themselves are set up with switches 1 and 2 OFF for separate circuit operation, switches 3, 4, and 5 OFF for the Whoop Tone, and switch 6 ON for high dBA (volume).

Other Features

There is an I/O port on the AFC-50 used as an initiating input in addition to the inputs on the SLC loop, but for a rather chilly problem this time around, as it is programmed as a silent auxiliary alarm to serve Edwards 3040CT-W panic switches mounted inside the walk-ins near each entrance and on both sides of the communicating door between them. An EOLR-1 is also present on this zone to supervise the power supply to it. (The panic switches will still work without power, but the LEDs won’t be lit.)

For a large day-care and local NGO office that’s being expanded with a group-home wing (and, for the purposes of this post, having its system replaced due to an inability to find new devices for it):

  • The building itself is laid out with:
    • its existing building (becoming the west wing) having:
      • storage/utility/tornado shelter space in the basement
      • daycare on the first floor
      • and office space on the second floor
    • the new lobby area (center wing) having:
      • more storage and utility space in the new section of the basement
      • the new lobby and gym/activity spaces on the first floor
      • and more offices on the second floor
    • and a new east wing, with:
      • a smallish enclosed garage and an additional tornado shelter in the basement
      • the new group home on the first floor
      • and conference/break spaces on the second floor, accessory to the offices

Fire Alarm

The panel is a Silent Knight 6700, located in the main lobby to spare the costs of an annunciator, and fitted with a Napco SLE-LTEV-FIRE communicator using dial capture to interface to the panel. The SLE-LTEV-FIRE is connected to one of its supplied antennae in addition to an external antenna on the roof of the building.

The SLC in this system is wired as a sectioned Class A SLC, with isolated sections for the lobby, daycare space, west wing basement, office space, group home, east wing garage, and lobby basement.

Initiation

Initiation consists of:

  • a single SK-PULL-DA pull located behind the receptionist’s desk
  • A Reecom R-200 weather radio that is:
    • tucked under the receptionist’s desk with its key lock enabled to prevent it from being fiddled with,
    • and hardwired to the MNS using:
      • the message 4 circuit on the SP40S MNS to monitor the radio’s external alert output
      • an XP Power DDC1524S12 to step the 24V auxiliary supply from the MNS down to 12V for the radio
      • and an EOLR-1 to supervise the 12V supply to the radio
  • sprinkler monitoring via a SK-MONITOR-2 at each of the building’s sprinkler zone valve assemblies and a SK-MINIMON supervising the sprinkler system’s backflow preventer
  • a SK-MONITOR-2 monitoring the hood system for the group home wing’s kitchen and the auxiliary sounder base power for the group home wing
  • SK-MINIMONs in the break room and daycare kitchen hoods supervising those suppression systems,
  • a SK-MINIMON that supervises the parking garage ventilation system,
  • a SK-MINIMON that supervises the stairwell reentry circuit via an EOLR-1,
  • a SK-MONITOR-2 in each of the boiler rooms (existing and new) that monitors an AGS Mini Merlin CH4CO-TWA in each room; the Mini Merlin also provides 120V power to a solenoid gas valve that shuts off gas to the culprit appliance when a gas or CO leak is detected
  • a SK-MONITOR-2 monitoring a COSMOD-2W with a pair of COSMO-2W detectors attached. This setup provides the “backup” protection located outside each of the two banks of bedrooms in the group home wing, with one detector per bank.
  • SK-PTIR-W smoke/heat/IR sensors in low frequency sounder bases in each of the group home’s bedrooms
  • SK-ACCLIMATE smoke sensors in the following locations:
    • Above the panel (which is also where the communicator lives)
    • Above each of the following doors/door banks, on both sides of the door, with a B224RB relay base located on the inside of the lobby/communicating space that controls the door electromagnets in conjunction with a relay from the PACS:
      • The two smoke doors on the 2nd floor (W and N)
      • The two smoke doors on the 1st floor (W and N)
      • the smoke/fire door between the 2nd floor communicating space and the 2nd floor east wing corridor
      • the fire door between the center office wing and the east wing corridor on the 2nd floor
      • and the smoke/fire doors between the 1st floor lobby and the 1st floor activity space
    • Above each elevator door for elevator recall
    • And in each elevator machine room with a B224RB for the flashing hat
  • A SK-RELAYMON-2 in each of the two elevator machine rooms that:
    • provides the main and alternate recall outputs
    • and provides an IDC that supervises the shunt trip power supply (as a trouble condition) and monitors the shunt trip heat detector, which is a FDD CF-135-2CO, via its NO contacts
  • and 3 SK-PTIR-Ws in the 2nd floor file room, set for Special Application use to maximize early warning of an incipient fire in that room

Hood Suppression and Control

The group home wing’s kitchen is fitted with a 4’ wide Type I hood with a CaptiveAire TANK system for suppression and a remote fan; this is sufficient to handle even a larger-than-normal range, and is not that much more costly than a hood that has integrated UL300A domestic suppression.

The suppression interlock system is also highly simplified compared to the norm, as we don’t have to worry about shutting down makeup air given the size of the fan relative to the size of the overall building, nor do we need to interlock this appliance with the operation of the hood fan. It consists of a microswitch from the suppression system where the NC contact goes to power the coil on a 120V coil, 50A/3P contactor, the NO contact goes to the exhaust fan hot in parallel with the fan switch, and the common terminal goes to the 120V exhaust fan supply. The range is then powered via two poles of the contactor, shutting it off when the suppression system fires.

The first floor kitchens (daycare & breakroom) are also being fitted to a similar standard, including the replacement of any existing gas appliances in these kitchens with electric appliances.

Elevator Shunt Trip

The shunt trip circuit itself is a bit unusual, as it consists of:

  • A GBPC2506 rectifier bridge with quick-connect terminals and matching quick-connects to wire it
  • A RIBMN2401D DPDT relay for reversing the shunt trip power
  • The aforementioned FDD CF-135-2CO heat detector’s NC contacts
  • A P2500 rectifier diode shunted by a 2.2kOhm, 1/2 watt resistor
  • and a Macromatic CAP10AD62 current sensing relay in a Macromatic 70170-D socket, with the threshold, hysteresis, and delay controls all set to their minimum values

The wiring goes as follows, with all circuits save for the contacts on the current sensing relay using non-power-limited wiring methods, and a barrier fitted in the box for the heat detector to separate the non-power-limited and power-limited sides:

  • AC in goes to the AC terminals on the rectifier
  • DC positive from the rectifier goes first to relay NC1, then to relay NO2, then to one heat detector NC terminal, then to one supply terminal (2/10) on the current sense relay
  • DC negative from the supply goes first to relay NO1, then to relay NC2, then to the coil common on the relay, then to the other supply terminal (10/2) on the current sensor
  • The other NC terminal on the heat detector is wired to the 120V coil terminal on the relay
  • The anode end of the diode/shunt resistor combo is wired to relay COM1
  • The cathode end of the diode/shunt resistor combo is wired to the positive end of the shunt trip
  • The negative end of the shunt trip is wired to the 5-100mA terminal (5) on the current sensing relay
  • The COM (8) terminal on the current sensing relay is connected to the COM2 terminal on the DPDT relay module
  • And the IDC is connected to the contact common (1) and NO (3) terminals of the relay, with its EOL resistor in series with the relay contact, after being shunted by the NO terminals on the heat detector.

This circuit trickles a small current (10-odd mA) through the shunt trip coils (which is not enough to start the shunt trip process moving mechanically) to provide open-circuit supervision (like a NAC or releasing solenoid circuit). When the heat detector trips, the DPDT relay reverses the polarity across the shunt trip coil and the diode-resistor pair (what’s basically a releasing supervision module), causing the diode to conduct and admit full power to the shunt trip coil, tripping the breaker. The heat detector shunting the IDC during the shunt trip process is essential to “override” the trouble indication that would otherwise be caused by the shunt trip’s coil clearing contacts.

Should there be an open circuit, though, the supervision current stops flowing through the shunt trip coil circuit, causing the current sense relay to open, which breaks the IDC and thus causes a trouble on the panel. Likewise, if there’s no power to the current sensing relay, then the contact goes to its unpowered Normally Open state, which also breaks the IDC, indicating the problem.

Notification (ECS/MNS)

Notification is handled using a mixed voice and tone system consisting of:

  • An Eaton SP40S SAFEPATH voice evacuation panel located behind the receptionist’s desk
    • Message 1 is CO evacuation, as per the SP40S manual
    • Message 2 is fire evacuation
    • Message 3 is natural gas leak evacuation
    • Message 4 is tornado/severe weather
    • Message 5 is a lockdown message
    • Message 6 is an intruder alarm message
    • and Message 7 is an all-clear message
    • The panel itself is driven from a SK-RELAYMON for messages 1 and 3 as well as the panel’s onboard alarm relay driving message 2 and is set for:
      • 70V operation
      • contact closure supervision ON on all used inputs
      • AC loss delay OFF
      • Temporal pretone on Messages 1,2, and 3, with continuous pretone on messages 4 and 5, and no pretone on message 6
      • 520Hz pretone enabled (to produce consistent pretone sounds for all messages)
      • temporal backup tone ON
      • its strobe output ON when Messages 4, 5, 6, the AUX input, or the microphone are in use
      • and 4-wire expansion mode,
      • with strobe sync OFF
      • and AC failure reporting delay disabled
    • Its master trouble and AC trouble relays are monitored by the SK-RELAYMON feeding messages 1 and 2
    • And is hooked to an Eaton SP4Z-A/B zone splitter directly feeding the three primary zones (lobby/basements, daycare space, and grouphome space) as well as the expansion amplifier for the 2nd floor
    • and an Edwards G1M-RM Signal Master on the panel’s strobe output
  • Edwards G4SVWN speaker strobes or Edwards G4VWN strobes in Edwards G4SEWN-A strobe expanders, with the speakers and expander strobes driven from the MNS and the main strobes driven directly from a FACP NAC
  • A pair of Edwards WG4WRN-SVMHC high output outdoor speaker strobes covering the outdoor patio space at the end of the 2nd floor of the east wing, tucked under overhangs to keep them from illuminating the sky needlessly when activated
  • An Eaton SPB80/4 booster amplifier fed from the 4th zone output of the SP4Z-A/B and the output of the signal master to provide booster power for notification on the 2nd floor, set for sync follower operation and wired in a four-wire configuration with separate AC trouble notification
  • An Altronix AL602ULADA NAC extender, set to sync follower mode and driven from the fire strobe NAC, to provide additional NAC power for the 2nd floor (since we need one of the 6700’s NACs to provide sounder base power)
  • And B200S-LF sounder bases for the smoke detectors in the bedrooms, connected to that sounder base power NAC supply, which is monitored by the SK-MONITOR-2 that also monitors the kitchen hood

There is also an exterior horn-strobe located at the FDC on the south side of the building and wired directly through the sprinkler waterflow switch(es) to provide sprinkler waterflow alarming.

Finally, all the notification appliances, sprinkler heads, and smoke detectors in the activity space are caged to protect them from physical damage.

Security and Access Control

The security system for this building and grounds consists of three parts, namely:

  • an Inner Range Inception setup for access control and intrusion detection,
  • a Resideo VISTA-128BPT with a 5881ENHC receiver fitted to handle mobile duress alarms within the daycare wing,
  • and a NVR with IP cameras to provide local video surveillance of key areas of the building and the adjacent parking lots.

Access Control and Intrusion

The access control and intrusion protection setup for this property is complex:

  • The offices on the 2nd floor need to be protected not only from outside intrusion, but errant kids and teens as well
  • The activity space on the 1st floor is shared between various wings of the building, in addition to being accessible from the lobby
  • The daycare wing has 2 existing exterior entrances (one on the main floor that leads to a vestibule, and another that leads directly into the south stairs) that need to be accounted for in addition to the new lobby doors
  • And the residential wing of the building is going to be occupied to some degree 24/7, even if the daycare section of the building is shuttered. This wing of the building also depends on the main lobby elevator to provide handicap access to the basement tornado shelter, but that elevator can only be reached by traveling through the main activity space and the front lobby.

As a result of these complexity issues, as well as the limitations imposed by:

  • the need to support OSDP to properly support higher security credential technologies that cannot be trivially sniffed and cloned,
  • the limitations of IT support in a quasi-educational NGO environment, where funding and personnel may not permit the maintenance of dedicated servers or workstations for on-premise access control, and subscription-based cloud licensing creates an ongoing vulnerability to operational cashflow issues
  • and the capabilities of available equipment,

the Inner Range Inception stands out from much of the rest of the pack. While not the cheapest possible system by far, it is well-made, well-documented, and has more than sufficient capability for the system at hand, in addition to being fully configurable through an onboard Web interface and supporting API-based and onboard-programmed automation. It’s also available through at least some vendors, complete with pricing, and competitively priced with many other access control options.

The system is set up to meet PASS Tier 2 recommendations, as well as supplying partitioned control to permit the office, daycare, lobby and activity space, and residential wing to be managed separately, and consists of:

  • A main Inception (996300NA) controller
    • living within its associated power supply enclosure in a secured wiring closet,
    • powered using an Altronix AL300ULXJG that is
      • set for 12V,
      • fitted with an 18Ah battery,
      • and protected by a Bosch ICP-EZTS tamper switch,
    • and wired as follows:
      • Relay 1 on the Inception triggers an Altronix RB1224 relay whose contacts shunt both IN2 on the communicator to report an intrusion to the authorities and IN6 on the MNS to provide local warning throughout the building.
      • Relay 2 on the Inception is set up to provide elevator car access control for the basement and 2nd floor calls on the existing elevator
      • Relay 3 on the Inception is set up to provide elevator car access control for the basement and 2nd floor calls on the new elevator
      • Relay 4 on the Inception is set up to provide hall call access control for the basement hall call station in the new section of the building
    • The tamper input on the Inception is connected to the tamper switch
    • Input 1 on the Inception is used for local power trouble monitoring
    • The READER RS-485 port on the Inception is connected to card readers:
      • at the basement and first floor hall calls in the new section of the building,
      • at the first floor hall call in the existing section of the building
      • and in the elevator cars, with the readers in the cars at the ends of the bus
    • And the LAN RS-485 port on the Inception is connected to the Inception RS-485 bus, leading out to the various door/intrusion control cabinets in the building
  • An 8 Zone LAN Expander (996005PCB&K) card located within the main control cabinet, wired to and powered from the Inner Range RS-485 LAN and with its I/O ports connected as follows:
    • Aux 1 on the expander is wired to provide hall call access control for the first existing elevator’s first floor hall calls
  • The readers are all Inner Range SIFER mullion readers (994720) with matching Inner Range MIFARE DESFire EV3 credentials (either factory custom or Gold Card user keyed), except for PIN-capable doors, which use SIFER keypad readers (994725) instead
  • Each of the access controlled doors in the building is assigned to one of 8 door groups, except for the intercom-equipped entrances, which are in a door group by themselves, and the main lobby entrance door, the garage door, and the remote parking lot gate, which are each handled separately. Each standard door group has its own access control cabinet, connected to the Inner Range RS-485 LAN and consisting of the following:
    • An Altronix Trove2IR2 enclosure/backplane combination
    • A LifeSafetyPower FPO75 (for 4 door groups) or FPO150 (for 8 door groups) supply card, set for 24VDC
    • A LifeSafetyPower B100 regulator card, set for 12VDC
    • 2 18Ah batteries (for 4 door groups) or 33 or 35Ah batteries (for 8 door groups) at the bottom of the cabinet
    • An Altronix ACM4CB (for 4 door groups) or ACM8CB (for 8 door groups) control card, using the cabinet’s 24V rail for both board and lock power and with its FAI wired to:
      • a “wet” global stairwell reentry circuit for door groups containing stairwell reentry doors
      • or a “wet” global lockdown circuit for door groups containing lockdown doors
    • An Inner Range ILAM (996018PCB&K) that is powered from the B100’s output using an Inner Range 996794 harness and:
      • uses its tamper input to monitor both enclosure tamper switches (the subpanel means we can’t use the ICP-EZTS dual tamper in this application)
      • monitors the supervisory contacts on the FPO150 using its REN1 input
      • connects to its associated readers via an OSDP daisy chain, with the reader power drawn directly from the B100
      • monitors the door position, latchbolt (“tongue”) position, and REX inputs from each door using the corresponding switch outputs
      • and use NO dry relay outputs to trigger the ACM input for each lock
    • and 1 (for 4 door groups) or 3 (for 8 door groups) Inner Range UniBus 2-door expander (996535PCB&K) cards, driven by the ILAM’s UniBus port and set up to:
      • monitor the door position, latchbolt (“tongue”) position, and REX inputs from each door using the corresponding switch outputs
      • and use NO dry relay outputs to trigger the ACM input for each lock
  • The two intercom-equipped doors share an access control panel that consists of the following:
    • An Altronix AL300ULXJG power supply, set for 24V, fitted with 2 15-18 Ah batteries, and equipped with a VR2T regulator to provide 12VDC to the SLAM and readers
    • An Inner Range SLAM (996012PCB&K) card, powered from the VR2T’s output with an Inner Range 996794 harness, attached to the Inner Range LAN, and connected to:
      • monitor the enclosure tamper switch, a Bosch ICP-EZTS, using its tamper input
      • monitor the door position, latchbolt (“tongue”) position, and REX switches from the door using its corresponding inputs
      • receive reader data and provide reader power via its Reader RS-485 port
      • receive REN inputs for each door from the intercom system’s remote REN contacts
      • and operate the locks from the 24V rail using its onboard relays and lock power distribution
    • An Inner Range 8-Zone LAN expander (996005PCB&K) that shares power with the SLAM and has its inputs wired up as follows:
      • Input 1 on the expander is wired to supervise the power supply to the intercom system
    • The Axis A9801 security relays from the door intercoms, with their NO contacts wired across the REN inputs on the SLAM
    • And a pair of Altronix NetWay1 PoE injectors to provide power to the intercoms
  • Axis I8116-E intercoms at the existing south and west entry doors, connected to their associated remote relays as well as the security network via the PoE injectors
  • The main entry door also has its own power setup, consisting of:
    • An AL300ULXX supply, set for 24V with 2 12Ah batteries and a VR2T 12V regulator in it
    • An Inner Range SLAM (996012PCB&K) card, powered from the VR2T’s output with an Inner Range 996794 harness, attached to the Inner Range LAN, and connected as follows:
    • The tamper input is connected to a Bosch ICP-EZTS tamper switch for the enclosure
    • The reader input is connected to and powers the reader for the inner doors
    • The REX, latchbolt, and door inputs are connected to their corresponding switches for each half of the inner door
    • The REN input for door 1 is connected to the power supply fault outputs
    • The REN input for door 2 is connected to door and latchbolt contacts for both leaves of the outer door to provide additional monitoring
    • Lock relay 1 provides 24V lock power to drive the ELRs on both inner door panics, and also controls a PAM-4 relay whose NO contacts are in series with the NO contacts on entry-side pushplate for the inner door (a BEA 10PBO241)
    • Lock relay 2 provides a NO contact output to the inner door’s low-energy operator that is in parallel with the inner-door/permission-relay circuit, as well as one set of contacts on the exit side pushplate (a SDC 484A2U).
    • And the outer door’s low energy operator is wired to the pushplate on the entry side of the outer door (another BEA 10PBO241, this time in a weatherproof box on a post), as well as the other set of contacts on the exit side pushplate.
  • And there is an Inner Range CLOE (995093) connected to the LAN bus and drawing power from it that bridges the Inner Range LAN over to the internal security Ethernet network; this is located in the panel enclosure

The intercom calls from the access system are received at the front desk either with a softphone and a second NIC in the user’s PC or via a SIP-capable videophone of some sort connected to both the IP phone system and the security network switch.

Intrusion Detection Sensing

In addition to the various door monitoring contacts connected to the Inception system, there are perimeter (glassbreak) and interior intrusion sensors connected to it as well. Each set of up to 31 sensor/zone inputs is connected to a cabinet consisting of the following:

  • An Altronix Trove2IR2 enclosure
  • An Altronix AL300ULXB2 power supply board, set for 12VDC and wired to a 12Ah battery
  • Two Altronix PD16WCB distribution cards, wired to the power supply output, to provide 31 isolated power zones for detectors
  • An Inner Range 8 Zone LAN Expander (996005PCB&K) powered from the first output on one of the PD16WCB’s via an Inner Range 996794 harness, connected to the Inner Range LAN, and wired as follows:
    • Input 1 on the LAN expander card is connected to the power supply fault contacts on the AL300ULXB2
    • The remaining inputs on the LAN expander card are connected to zones
    • And the tamper switch input on the LAN expander card is connected to the enclosure front and back tampers
  • And up to 3 Inner Range UniBus 8 Zone Input Expander (996500PCB&K) cards, wired to the UniBus port on the LAN Expander

The sensors used are a mix of Honeywell FG1025Z directional and FG1625RFM non-directional glassbreak sensors for perimeter protection along with contacts and latchbolt/deadbolt (the latter when present) monitoring strikes for regular swinging doors that are not badge controlled.

Garage Door and Parking Gate Access

The garage door and parking gate each have their own access control cabinets due to the specialized requirements that come up in each case. The garage cabinet is powered from the garage door opener’s 24VAC control supply via a PowerStream PST-AC24DC12 24VAC to 12VDC switching converter, and contains:

  • An Inner Range SLAM (996012PCB&K) card, powered from the switching converter’s output with an Inner Range 996794 harness, attached to the Inner Range LAN, and connected as follows:
    • Its tamper input is connected to a Bosch ICP-EZTS enclosure tamper switch
    • Its door 1 position input is connected to the door contacts for the garage door
    • Its card reader RS-485 input is connected to the card reader on the outside of the garage door
    • And its door 1 relay NO contact is wired into the door opening circuit for the garage door
  • And a pair of Seco-Larm LD-1123-PAQ loop detectors, one for the exit loop and one for the entrance loop, also powered from the switching converter’s output and wired as follows:
    • The detector for the outside loop has its NO presence contact wired in series with the the SLAM’s door relay
    • And the detector for the inside loop has its NO presence and pulse contacts wired in series with each other and across the overall open circuit for the door operator

The opener itself is a Manaras-Opera OMT with MLC-K36 light curtains, inside and out, attached via a Manaras-Opera INTERFACE003 splitter to provide entrapment protection. The opener’s operating circuit is wired across the loop detector terminals, and it is configured in TS (timer to close with retry) mode with a timer long enough to permit someone to drive through the opening smoothly before the door starts to close.

The parking lot access control system, on the other hand, is powered from the output of an Altronix VR2T connected to the 24V accessory supply from the entrance gate operator, and consists of:

  • An Inner Range CLOE (995093) LAN-over-Ethernet bridge, powered from the VR2T with an Inner Range 996794 harness, wired to the Ethernet switch for the parking lot security system, and connected via RS-485 to
  • An Inner Range SLAM (996012PCB&K), also powered from the VR2T with an Inner Range 996794 harness, that has its reader RS-485 bus wired to the gate entry reader and its NO door relay contacts wired to activate the gate if a car is also present
  • And a Seco-Larm LD-1123-PAQ loop detector for the entrance gate loop and powered from the VR2T, whose NO presence output is wired in series with the SLAM’s door relay in the gate presence (activation) circuit

The gate operator is a FAAC B614, with a second Seco-Larm LD-1123-PAQ loop detector with its NO contacts paralleled fitted to serve the protection (under-gate) loop and a Seco-Larm E-936-S45RRGQ retroreflective photoeye wired to the gate operator STOP input as a NC output with a lowside output powerbreak from one of the gate operator’s outputs to provide an anti-entrapment failsafe. The exit gate operator is wired similarly, but with the pulse output from its entrance loop replacing the SLAM’s door output.

Video Surveillance

The video surveillance system is designed to be straightforward, but effective, and meet PASS Tier 1 and exterior Tier 2 recommendations without using an excessive number of cameras or intruding on the privacy of residents of the grouphome wing. It consists of:

  • A Speco N32NRN4TB NVR, with one of its Ethernet ports connected to the main Ethernet network
  • A Planet Tech FGSW-2622VHP 24+4 port PoE switch for the cameras in/on the building with its uplink ports connected as follows:
    • One uplink port is connected to the NVR’s other NIC
    • And the other copper uplink port is connected to a port on the security headend switch to allow the NVR to connect to the parking lot cameras, elevator camera, and video intercoms
  • 2MP outdoor starlight fixed dome PoE cameras with SD cards fitted for local recording in the following locations:
    • On lightpoles viewing opposite corners of the remote parking lot, with at least one camera having a view of the entrance to and exit from the lot
    • On a lightpole opposite the garage entrance to view the garage exits and dumpster enclosure
  • 2MP outdoor starlight fixed dome PoE cameras in the following locations, with SD cards fitted for local recording and provided with local backup power systems consisting of AL125ULs and 7Ah batteries:
    • Over the existing service door corner to have a view of the main entrance
    • Two cameras at the southeastern corner of the east wing of the building:
      • One on the east side of the corner provides views of the garage approach and dumpster area
      • And one on the south side of the corner provides views of the exit patio on the east side of the existing building
    • And over the main entrance to have a view down the drop-off drive
  • A 2MP outdoor rated PoE starlight fixed dome in the garage with a view of the exit doors there
  • A 2MP outdoor rated PoE starlight fixed dome overlooking the roof deck from its NE corner
  • 5MP indoor fixed dome PoE cameras in the following locations:
    • In the existing south stairwell to have a view of the exterior entrance there
    • Near the existing west entrance, on the back wall of the T-junction located past the vestibule, to have a view of that exterior entrance as well
    • Three cameras in the lobby area:
      • One with a view of the main entrance
      • One with a view of the exit from the activity space
      • And one with a view of the lobby-to-childcare-wing doors
    • In the corridor connecting to the east-side entrance to the childcare wing, with a view of that entrance door
    • One located on the north wall of the existing building’s main floor open space (southwest corner of the existing building) with a view of the service entry/exit there
    • One located on the west wall of the west-to-south corridor junction, looking east to provide additional surveillance of the south stair exit to the main floor
    • And one located in the new classroom corridor, looking east to west towards the exit door at the end of that corridor from where the hall widens out to accommodate the lockers and wheelchair ramps located within it
  • A 5MP indoor dome camera located opposite the file room door and aimed so it can surveil both the file room door and the elevator lobby area nearby
  • A 5MP indoor dome camera on the upper portion of the new lobby’s front wall set up to cover the connecting balcony space between the various parts of the 2nd floor, including the elevator and stair doors there in addition to the T-junction that serves the new office section
  • And an 8MP impact/vandal resistant 360° fisheye camera in the new gym/activity space (while vandalism may or may not be a threat for a camera on the ceiling of such a space, accidents certainly are!)

(continued in my next post, yet again!)

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(continued from my previous post!)

Panic System

While the Inception can handle portable panic buttons using an Inovonics receiver module, the limitations of the Inovonics 3-function panic device and the sheer number of zones/inputs that the panics occupy mean that an approach using separate hardware is both superior and more cost-effective. (This also provides a degree of redundancy should the main access control system fail catastrophically.)

This system consists of:

  • A Honeywell Vista-128BPT in a secure wiring closet with:
    • siren supervision enabled
    • a 4Ah backup battery fitted to provide a minimum of 6 hours of battery runtime (we can’t go higher due to limitations of the 5800RPs)
    • a 5881ENHC receiver connected and mounted adjacent to the panel
    • and a 4204 quad relay card mounted inside the panel enclosure
  • A SDC 701TUL2SN (custom ordered) located behind the receptionist’s desk to provide annunciation of assistance-needed and trouble conditions, as well as a reset facility
  • Honeywell 5800RP repeaters placed as-needed to achieve full coverage of the building
  • And Ecolink WST-132 panic buttons issued to appropriate staff and programmed as follows:
    • A single push activates the LED and siren on the annunciator to alert the receptionist that assistance is needed
    • A double tap (within 1 second) causes the panic system to trip the panic zone on the communicator to silently alert authorities without providing any local notification or annunciation
    • and the user pressing and holding the button for at least 3 seconds causes the panic system to put the building into lockdown, with full MNS notification and alerting to authorities via the communicator’s panic zone

The system is wired with:

  • The siren output of the Vista connected to a PAM-SD relay that trips IN5 on the MNS to provide lockdown notification, as well as to various “wet” inputs on door supplies to release held-open doors during lockdown
  • Relay 1 on the Vista wired to trip IN3 on the communicator to notify authorities of silent panic and lockdown conditions
  • Relay 2 on the Vista wired to energize the red LED on the keyswitch as an annunciation of alarm conditions:
    • Steady red indicates a request-for-assistance condition
    • Flashing red indicates an alarm (lockdown) condition
  • Relay 3 on the Vista wired to de-energize the green LED on the keyswitch as an annunciation of trouble conditions:
    • Steady green indicates system normal
    • Flashing green indicates a trouble
  • Relay 4 on the Vista wired to energize the siren on the keyswitch in the following fashion:
    • Steady siren indicates request for assistance
    • Pulsing siren (march time) indicates a trouble
  • Zone 7 on the Vista is programmed as a tamper zone (zone type 05) and is shunted by the NO contacts of the keyswitch to permit the receptionist to reset alarms on the system
  • and Zone 9 on the Vista is connected as a NC loop to a holdup button under the receptionist’s desk so the receptionist can trigger a silent panic condition even if the wireless system is down. (It also means the receptionist doesn’t need to be issued a wireless panic device.)

The remaining zones on the Vista (1-6, 8, and 10-128) are all available for panic devices, permitting the system to handle a total of 42 of the Ecolink panic buttons.

Emergency Communications

There are also “blue light” emergency phones, 1 in each of the two parking lots, monitored by the same service provider that is used for elevator communications monitoring. These phones are Viking E-1600-BL-IPEWPs, and are paired with a Planet ISW-514PTF PoE switch fitted with Planet MFB-TFX fiber transceivers providing a fiber uplink to a Planet GSD-2210-8T2S switch fitted with Planet MFB-FX transceivers that serves as part of the NVR’s headend system.

DC power to the cameras and phone in the on-site parking lot is provided using a pole mounted setup that consists of:

  • A 120W Renogy ShadowFlux RSP120DC-ASR-US solar panel at the top of the pole
  • A Victron BlueSolar MPPT 75/10 solar charger, with its input connected to the solar panel and its charging port connected in parallel with the power supply’s battery charging port
  • A Keystone KTAT-250-480-277/A autotransformer to step the 277V supply down to 240V for the power supply
  • A 12V, 12Ah sealed-lead battery to provide at least 8 hours of backup
  • And an Altronix SMP3WP power supply/charger set for 12V operation

The adjacent-site parking lot, though, has a gate and gate operator, so we draw power from the 120V gate operator circuit via another Altronix SMP3WP set for 12V operation and fitted with a 12Ah battery.

Parking Garage Ventilation

The parking garage ventilation system consists of:

  • A Canarm AX30-EC variable speed, single phase, direct drive exhaust fan capable of over 6200cfm at around 0.125" water gauge of static pressure and mounted adjacent to the garage’s pedestrian door. This fan is wired with:
    • A pair of fixed resistors, adding up to somewhere between 50-100kΩ, connected as a voltage divider across the speed control terminals to set the “low” speed of the fan to yield an airflow of about 500 cfm
    • And wiring from the fan contact on the ventilation control CO/NOx detector brought over to shunt the high side of the speed control divider. This is used to kick the fan into full speed operation when the detector calls for increased ventilation.
  • A 24V, 20VA transformer wired so that its primary is run from the power terminals of the fan and its secondary powers the detector
  • A PAM-1 across the detector’s power connection to supervise detector and fan power
  • And the ventilation detector itself, a Senva TGW-ACN-A, run from the 24VAC transformer secondary and monitored for alarm conditions by the fire alarm system

This provides demand-controlled ventilation of the parking garage at a reasonably low cost and with low complexity, as well as a first stage alarm to warn of excessive exhaust gas buildup in the garage before it reaches the living spaces above.

Elevator Emergency Communications

The new elevator receives an emergency video/text communication system consisting of:

  • The existing elevator phone line, with a Viking LC-3 line concentrator used to aggregate the new elevator phone in with it (at least until the existing elevator is fully retrofit)
  • A Viking LV-1K annunciator at the new elevator’s first floor call location to watch for any elevator phone line failures
  • An EmerCom (the Canadian version) EMC-60-MSG emergency phone in the new elevator to supply voice comms and text prompts over a standard phone line
  • A 2MP IP corner camera powered from the elevator emergency power system and connected to a port on the building services router via a pair of L-Com LCTP-10BT-10B2 10Base-T to 10Base-2 (!) converters and a coaxial cable in the traveling cable assembly

Building Services Router and Connection

The building services router is a WatchGuard Firebox NV5, running off an Altronix AL300ULXX, set for 12V and fitted with a pair of 12Ah batteries connected in parallel. The WAN port from the Firebox feeds a K-Tech Dual Air cellular gateway, along with the elevator phone line (to free them up to migrate to VoIP phone service).

The LAN side of the Firebox is connected to both the elevator camera (with a port spare for the camera or communicator from the existing elevator when that retrofit happens) and to a port on the GSD-2210-8T2S that serves the rest of the building and emergency services system.

Faraday system at a daycare

*UMMTs in basement along with bg-10s and i3s
*UMHUs in hallways and some classrooms
*System sensor i3 in bathrooms
*MS-5 in kitchen with system sensor heat detectors
*3 outdoor ACENDs in the patio
UMHUs and ACENDs are synced by ms-5

*One umhst at an exit with a faraday rebranded rsg t bar